Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses) by Jensen, Erik M.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
2006 
Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses) 
Erik M. Jensen 
Case Western University School of Law, emj@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Jensen, Erik M., "Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses)" (2006). 
Faculty Publications. 200. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/200 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
!JENSEN-212-INTERPRETINGTHESIXTEENTHAMENDMENT1.DOC 8/23/2005 3:39 PM 
 
355 
INTERPRETING THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(BY WAY OF THE DIRECT-TAX CLAUSES) 
Erik M. Jensen* 
Readers of Constitutional Commentary may have missed the 
brouhahas, but Professor Calvin Johnson and I have been arguing for 
several years about the meaning of the Direct-Tax Clauses of the 
Constitution1 and the Sixteenth Amendment to that Constitution.2 I’m 
happy to say we disagree on almost everything, and less happy to note 
that neither constitutional lawyers nor tax lawyers seem to care very 
much about any of these issues.3 
Our disagreements aren’t only about academic trivia. For those 
who insist on practical consequences in legal arguments, there really 
may be something at stake here. The Direct-Tax Clauses, parts of the 
original Constitution, impose a cumbersome apportionment require-
ment on taxes that are “direct”—a rule tied to the apportionment rule 
for representation in the House of Representatives. In its original 
form, Article I, section 2 provided that 
[r]epresentatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included within this Union, according 
to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding 
to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to 
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three 
fifths of all other Persons. 
 
* David L. Brennan Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 3. There are exceptions. For example, apparently worried that his wealth-tax proposals 
would be at risk if I were taken seriously, Professor Bruce Ackerman has trashed me at some 
length. See Bruce Ackerman, Taxes and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 30 n.112, 
52-56 (1999). And the editors of the widely read journal Tax Notes have graciously printed just 
about everything Professor Johnson and I have wanted to say on the subject, most recently in 
Erik M. Jensen, The Constitution Matters in Tax, 100 TAX NOTES 821 (2003). See also Law-
rence Zelenak, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the Conscientious Legislator, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1999) (another tax professor encroaching on what would be constitutional 
lawyers’ turf if con lawyers cared about this sort of thing). 
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The special counting conventions for slaves and “Indians not taxed” 
disappeared long ago,4 but the apportionment rule remains. And Arti-
cle I, section 9, clause 4 similarly provides that “[n]o Capitation, or 
other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or 
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.” 
Everyone agrees that apportionment makes direct taxes very dif-
ficult to implement. The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, pro-
vided some relief, eliminating apportionment as a requirement for 
“taxes on incomes”: “The Congress shall have power to lay and col-
lect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without appor-
tionment among the several States, and without regard to any census 
or enumeration.” But the Amendment seemed to leave apportionment 
intact for other direct taxes, whatever they are. Avoiding apportion-
ment thus requires that a levy be either indirect, in which case the Di-
rect-Tax Clauses won’t kick in at all (and the Sixteenth Amendment 
will be irrelevant), or a tax on incomes, which the Sixteenth Amend-
ment immunizes. 
A broad definition of “direct taxes” coupled with a narrow con-
ception of “taxes on incomes” could leave the Direct-Tax Clauses 
with application broad enough to prevent significant change in the 
way the United States raises revenue. In the last decade, several new 
forms of national taxation have been proposed, including taxes on 
wealth5 and various types of consumption taxes.6 If these taxes would 
be direct but wouldn’t be taxes on incomes, they would have to be 
apportioned to be constitutionally valid. And if apportionment would 
 
 4. The Civil War Amendments took care of the rule for slaves, see U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, §§ 1-2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, and the category of “Indians not taxed” was effectively 
eliminated by statute. Indians “born within the territorial limits of the United States” are U.S. 
citizens as a result of the Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, (43 Stat. 253) 253 repealed by Act of 
June 27, 1952, ch. 1, § 301 (66 Stat.) 235 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)), and are thus 
generally subject to U.S. taxation. 
 5. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999); 
Ackerman, supra note 3, at 56-58. 
 6. Proposed indirect-consumption taxes include a national sales tax or value-added tax. 
See Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Role of a Value-Added Tax in Fundamental Tax Reform, in 
FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 91 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996); Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Saving 
and Consumption Taxation: The Federal Retail Sales Tax Example, in FRONTIERS OF TAX 
REFORM, supra, at 160. The best-known proposed direct-consumption taxes are the so-called 
“flat tax,” born in the academy but promoted by Steve Forbes and Dick Armey, see ROBERT E. 
HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995);, and the “USA Tax” (Unlimited Sav-
ings Allowance Tax), sponsored by Senators Nunn and Domenici, see S. 722, 104th Cong. 
(1995); see also Murray Weidenbaum, The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax: Analysis and Compari-
sons, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra, at 54. I’ll not try to prove here that the flat tax and 
the USA tax would be consumption taxes (that is, they would be structured to exclude the sav-
ings component of income from the tax base, leaving only amounts spent on consumption). But 
no one seriously disagrees with that characterization; it was their universally understood charac-
ter that made the proposals attractive to supporters and anathema to detractors. 
!JENSEN-212-INTERPRETINGTHESIXTEENTHAMENDMENT1.DOC 8/23/2005  3:39 PM 
2004] INTERPRETING SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT 357 
 
be required for a proposed tax, the tax probably wouldn’t be enacted: 
it’s been 142 years since Congress went to the trouble of apportioning 
a tax.7 
All of this is a long-winded way of explaining why I’m discuss-
ing the Direct-Tax Clauses in an exchange on interpreting the Six-
teenth Amendment. The process of interpreting the Amendment is in-
evitably also the process of interpreting the Clauses. You can’t hope 
to understand the Amendment without understanding what it was a 
reaction to. 
The scope of the Amendment and the scope of the Clauses de-
pend on the interpretation of two terms, “direct taxes” and “taxes on 
incomes.” The Sixteenth Amendment doesn’t matter, under any the-
ory of interpretation, unless the Direct-Tax Clauses have some sub-
stance—unless, that is, the term “direct taxes” encompasses a signifi-
cant body of levies.8 And the Direct-Tax Clauses have no remaining 
substance today if every levy that might otherwise have been subject 
to the Clauses can be characterized as a “tax on incomes.” 
My conclusions about the proper way to interpret the Direct-Tax 
Clauses and the Sixteenth Amendment are simple: constitutional pro-
visions ought to be taken seriously, and we ought to resist interpretive 
principles that would have the effect of gutting those provisions. Yes, 
the Direct-Tax Clauses took a peculiar form, but they were intended 
to be serious limitations on the national taxing power. And, although 
the Amendment was intended to cut back on the scope of the 
Clauses—to make an unapportioned income tax possible—it too 
should be interpreted in a way that takes the Clauses seriously. If, as I 
argue, the term “taxes on incomes” was intended to exempt only a 
particular (albeit important) category of taxes from apportionment, 
the apportionment rule has continuing effect for direct taxes that 
aren’t taxes on incomes. 
Because issues of constitutionality often merge with issues of 
desirability, especially in popular discussions, it’s worth making a 
couple of points to prevent misunderstanding of my arguments. First, 
when I defend the significance of the Direct-Tax Clauses, I don’t 
mean to suggest that I would have drafted limitations on the taxing 
power in the way the founders did. My drafting preferences don’t 
matter, nor do Professor Johnson’s. Calvin Johnson and I are trying to 
understand the Constitution as it is, not as we wish it to be. 
 
 7. The last apportioned direct tax was the Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, (12 Stat.) 292. 
 8. The Amendment was historically important regardless of the meaning of the Direct-
Tax Clauses. Whether the Amendment had any legal significance or not, it was probably politi-
cally necessary to get an income tax enacted. 
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In addition, my exchange with Professor Johnson isn’t about the 
most desirable forms of taxation. The universes of desirable taxes and 
constitutional taxes overlap, but they aren’t necessarily identical. It 
may be that my understanding of the relevant constitutional provi-
sions would prevent Congress from enacting forms of taxation that I 
would prefer, and it’s certainly the case that the Constitution permits 
forms of taxation that Professor Johnson and I find odious. None of 
that is relevant to the present discussion. 
To set the stage, in Part I, I outline the relevant constitutional 
structure. In Part II, I describe what I see as the fundamental differ-
ences (other than height and weight) between Professor Johnson and 
me. In Part III, I discuss the interpretive principles that ought to con-
trol in understanding the Direct-Tax Clauses. In Part IV I do the same 
for the Sixteenth Amendment. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE  
AFFECTING “DIRECT” TAXATION: THE BASICS 
The Constitution’s overall taxing power is broad: “The Congress 
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Ex-
cises.”9 But two clauses in the Constitution limit congressional power 
to enact “direct taxes” by requiring that such taxes be apportioned 
among the states on the basis of population. That’s a tough require-
ment to meet: if your state has one-tenth of the total population, it 
should bear one-tenth of the aggregate direct-tax liability, regardless 
of the state’s proportion of the national tax base.10 
If your state also has one-tenth of the relevant national tax base, 
apportionment presents no particular problem: your one-tenth of the 
population will have to pay one-tenth of the total direct-tax liability. 
You might dislike the particular tax, and you might dislike the way 
the tax burden is distributed among your state’s citizens and residents, 
but you shouldn’t feel that your state is being gouged. 
But suppose your state’s share of the direct-tax base is only one-
twentieth of the national total. Each taxed item in your state will be 
subject to tax at a rate double the otherwise applicable average, or 
Congress will have to come up with some other, equally klutzy 
mechanism to make the apportionment numbers come out right. 
Whatever the mechanism adopted, you and your fellow citizens of 
 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 10. I’m referring to “aggregate direct-tax liability” to mean the aggregate for any particu-
lar direct tax. If Congress were to enact more than one direct tax requiring apportionment, the 
apportionment would be done tax by tax, or so I assume. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
!JENSEN-212-INTERPRETINGTHESIXTEENTHAMENDMENT1.DOC 8/23/2005  3:39 PM 
2004] INTERPRETING SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT 359 
 
state X (particularly the citizens who might feel the pinch of a higher 
tax rate) are unlikely to see the tax as fair.11 
Or if your state’s share of the direct tax due is one-fifth of the na-
tional total? Each item will be subject to tax at a rate one-half the oth-
erwise applicable average—good for your state, but bad for others. If 
Congress went ahead with direct taxation in those circumstances, 
when there’s significant geographical variation, the statute would 
look very different from what we’re used to. 
This description is making apportionment sound more off-
putting than it really is because not all levies are apportioned. The 
Constitution effectively divides the tax universe into direct taxes, 
which must be apportioned (unless exempted by the Sixteenth 
Amendment), and all other levies, which I’ll call “indirect taxes.” 
“Indirect taxes” isn’t a constitutional term, but it’s a shorthand way to 
refer to the “Duties, Imposts and Excises”—a subset of the “Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises” that Congress has the “Power To lay 
and collect”—that, under Article I, section 8, must “be uniform 
throughout the United States.”12 The uniformity rule has been inter-
preted to require only geographical uniformity for indirect taxes,13 
meaning that, “if a particular item is subject to tax, it must be taxed at 
the same rate throughout the United States, wherever it may be 
found.”14 (For the moment, I’m ignoring another limitation on both 
direct and indirect taxes, the Export Clause’s prohibition against taxes 
or duties on “Articles exported.”)15 
I’ve argued elsewhere that indirect taxes were generally under-
stood to be those levies that are imposed on transfers of articles of 
consumption.16 The founders assumed that the burden of such taxes 
was shifted to the ultimate consumer. As a result, there’s no incentive 
for the national government to raise an indirect tax rate too high be-
cause, if it does so, revenue will actually decrease: would-be purchas-
 
 11. For example, suppose we’re talking about an income tax and suppose (unrealistically, 
given the Sixteenth Amendment) that an income tax must be apportioned. Your average state 
resident will have to pay as much in income tax as is paid by the average person nationally—
probably meaning the tax rates applicable in your state will double the national average—even 
though your average resident has only one half of the national per capita income. 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 13. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83-106 (1900). 
 14. Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal Govern-
ment, 41 TAX LAW. 3, 10 (1987). 
 15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5; Erik M. Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 
1 (2003) [hereinafter Jensen, Export Clause]. 
 16. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption 
Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2393-97 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen, Appor-
tionment]; Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of 
“Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1973-77 (2001) [hereinafter Jensen, Taxing Power]. 
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ers will buy something else instead, or will take other actions to avoid 
or evade tax liability. With this understanding, the founders thought 
that no limitation other than the uniformity rule was necessary to con-
strain indirect taxation.  
In contrast, direct taxes were understood not to be shiftable or 
avoidable—the burden was assumed to be borne by the party on 
whom the tax was imposed—and the potential for governmental 
abuse was therefore greater. At some level, any tax is avoidable, of 
course—including levies that almost everyone concedes to be direct. 
Suicide takes care of capitation tax obligations, and not buying real 
estate takes care of real-estate tax obligations. But the ease of avoid-
ance is substantially greater when the choice is whether to buy a 
bushel of taxed wheat. 
Under the constitutional scheme, any national levy is subject to 
either the apportionment rule or the uniformity rule—one or the 
other.17 And the logic of the structure is that both rules can’t apply to 
the same levy. Geographically variable tax rates—which wouldn’t be 
permissible with a levy governed by the uniformity rule—are all but 
inevitable with an apportioned tax. (That’s why the uniformity rule, 
by its terms, doesn’t apply to “taxes.”) In the unlikely event that a di-
rect-tax base is absolutely uniform geographically (that is, the distri-
bution of the tax base among the states correlates perfectly with popu-
lation), the tax would seem to satisfy both the uniformity and 
apportionment rules. But only the apportionment rule would be tech-
nically applicable in that case. 
For the first century of the nation’s existence, the direct-tax ap-
portionment rule played an important but limited role. Congress knew 
how to apportion a tax, and it explicitly did so with several real-estate 
taxes between 1798 and 1861.18 Except for those direct taxes and a 
Civil War income tax, however, the national government generally 
relied for revenue on levies that were indirect, tariffs and excises. Fur-
thermore, the understandings had developed, based on dicta in the 
1796 decision in Hylton v. United States,19 that apportionment is re-
quired only when it’s easy to do (that is, when it imposes no substan-
tial limitation on the taxing power) and that the only direct taxes for 
 
 17. There might be a residual category of levies subject to neither rule, but no one has 
figured out what such a levy would be. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 2341 and 
n.37. 
 18. See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, (12 Stat.) 292; Act of Mar. 5, 1816, ch. 24, (3 Stat.) 
255; Act of Feb. 27, 1815, ch. 60, (3 Stat.) 216; Act of Jan. 9, 1815, ch. 21, (3 Stat.) 164; Act of 
Aug. 2, 1813, ch. 37, (3 Stat.) 53; Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, (1 Stat.) 597. 
 19. 3 U.S. 171 (1796) (holding that a tax on carriages wasn’t direct and therefore didn’t 
have to be apportioned). 
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which apportionment is required are capitation taxes and taxes on real 
estate.20 That didn’t leave much of a role for apportionment. 
The Direct-Tax Clauses contain no language that would support 
either of the Hylton dicta—indeed, it’s counterintuitive to think that a 
limitation on the taxing power should apply only when it has no limit-
ing effects—but in several nineteenth century cases, the Hylton dic-
tum about capitation and real-estates taxes was restated as if it were 
scripture.21 Until 1895, each unapportioned tax evaluated by the Su-
preme Court was characterized as a duty, impost, or excise—subject 
to the uniformity rule but not requiring apportionment. For example, 
in 1881, the Court upheld the validity of the Civil War income tax 
against the claim that it was a direct tax that hadn’t been properly ap-
portioned. The income tax, said the Court, was “within the category 
of an excise or duty.”22 
Then came the Supreme Court’s two 1895 decisions in Pollock 
v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,23 which struck down an 1894 income 
tax for violating the apportionment rule. (It took two decisions be-
cause the Court left so many open questions the first time.) On the 
controlling issues, the Court split 5-4, and given the post-Hylton case 
law, the result in Pollock was striking. To many, Pollock was a disas-
trous break with precedent—“the Dred Scott decision of government 
revenue,” wrote Edwin Seligman.24 
The Court actually made a noble effort to link its conclusion in 
Pollock to Hylton, concluding that there was no constitutional distinc-
tion between a tax on real estate and a tax on the income from real es-
tate, but the tones of Hylton and Pollock were so different that the 
cases can be reconciled at only the most technical (and therefore mis-
leading) level. In effect, by reconsidering the dictates of the Direct-
Tax Clauses and by reconsidering the nature of an income tax, Pol-
 
 20. See id. at 174-75 (Chase, J.); id. at 177 (Paterson, J.); id. at 181, 183 (Iredell, J.); infra 
Part III.D.1. 
 21. See, e.g., Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) (“[D]irect taxes, within 
the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and 
taxes on real estate . . . “); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331, 348 (1875) (characterizing an estate tax 
on real estate an as excise on passage of value, rather than a direct tax on real-estate ownership); 
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 543 (1869) (noting that direct taxes imposed to 1869 had 
been on real estate, and that “personal property, contracts, occupations, and the like, have never 
been regarded by Congress as proper subjects of direct tax”). 
 22. Springer, 102 U.S. at 602; see also Scholey, 90 U.S. at 347 (“it is expressly decided 
that the term [‘direct taxes’] does not include the tax on income”). 
 23. 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (determining that taxation of income from real estate is unconsti-
tutional), vacated by 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (extending same principle to income from personal 
property and concluding that entire 1894 income-tax statute was unconstitutional). 
 24. Edwin R.A. Seligman, THE INCOME TAX 589 (1911). Professor Ackerman compares 
Pollock to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 5. 
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lock dramatically extended the universe of taxes potentially subject to 
apportionment. 
After 1895 the Direct-Tax Clauses seemed important once again, 
but, despite Pollock, the idea of an income tax wasn’t going to disap-
pear. The income tax had become popular in Washington, and not 
only with Populist firebrands. Democrats and a few Republicans were 
critical of Congress’s historical reliance on consumption taxes, gener-
ally excises and tariffs, to fund the government.25 Consumption taxes 
didn’t hit the rich nearly hard enough, and, in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, there were some incredibly rich, and very visible, people. The 
push for an income tax was a push for fairness in the tax system—
taxes should be based on ability to pay, it was argued—and the road-
block thrown by Pollock turned out to be temporary.26 
The Sixteenth Amendment was the national response to Pollock. 
The Amendment, which worked its way through Congress in 1909 
and was ratified in 1913, provides that “taxes on incomes, from what-
ever source derived,” needn’t be apportioned. The Amendment was 
necessary if only because it turned out to be politically impossible for 
Congress to attempt another income tax with Pollock still on the 
books: bucking a Supreme Court decision by enacting a new statute 
was more than many congressmen were willing to try, even if they 
thought Pollock horribly wrong. But with the Constitution amended, 
the Court’s sensitivities were irrelevant. The Amendment made it 
possible for Congress to enact the modern unapportioned income tax, 
with geographically uniform rates.27 
II. THE COMBATANTS: JENSEN VERSUS JOHNSON 
Some of my views about interpreting the Direct-Tax Clauses and 
the Sixteenth Amendment were obviously reflected in the way I de-
scribed the basics in Part I above. I’ll now make my positions on sev-
eral areas of contention explicit and contrast them with what I under-
stand to be Professor Johnson’s views. 
Here in essence is what I think. (1) By requiring direct taxes to 
be apportioned among the states on the basis of population, the foun-
 
 25. There had been an income tax during the Civil War, but it was temporary. It continued 
in effect until 1872. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1093-95. 
 26. See id. at 1093-1107. 
 27. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1107-28. This isn’t to say the effects are 
the same throughout the country. States with higher per capita incomes will pay a disproportion-
ately large per capita amount in income taxes. Indeed, one of the constitutional challenges to the 
1894 income tax, which applied only to incomes above $4,000, was that it was sectional in its 
effects. The burden was to be overwhelmingly borne by residents of a few northeastern, indus-
trialized states. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 2367 n.173. 
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ders intended the Direct-Tax Clauses to have real effect in limiting 
the national tax power. (2) The Supreme Court’s early gutting of the 
Clauses in Hylton, with dicta limiting the category of “direct taxes” to 
easily apportionable taxes and, more specifically, to capitation and 
real-estate taxes, was wrong. (3) The Court did a much better job 
when it reinvigorated the Clauses a century later in Pollock.28 (4) Be-
cause of the validity of the Court’s result (if not all the reasoning) in 
Pollock, the Sixteenth Amendment was critical in making the modern 
income tax (but only the income tax) possible.29 The bottom line: any 
tax that is a direct tax but not a “tax on incomes” must be apportioned 
to be valid, and the universe of taxes potentially subject to apportion-
ment isn’t trivial. These taxes probably include, for example, a wealth 
tax and a direct-consumption tax. 
Contrarian that he is, Professor Johnson disagrees at every step. 
As I understand it, this is what he thinks. (1) The Direct-Tax Clauses 
were nonsense-on-stilts from the beginning. (2) The Supreme Court 
properly gutted the Clauses in 1796, limiting their application to at 
most capitation and real-estate taxes. (3) The Pollock decisions were 
clearly wrong in 1895. (4) Because Pollock was wrong, the Sixteenth 
Amendment was substantively unnecessary. The real purpose of the 
Amendment was to make it politically possible to proceed with a new 
income-tax statute, not to create new constitutional law. The Amend-
ment can be interpreted as if it had torn Pollock out of U.S. Reports: 
in Professor Johnson’s view, the effect was to return the tax world to 
the pre-1895 understanding of the Direct-Tax Clauses, with Hylton 
once again in full glory. 
The direct-tax apportionment rule would get in Congress’s way 
if it were taken seriously, and Professor Johnson does his dogged best 
to make sure that doesn’t happen. If there might otherwise be doubt 
about the characterization of a proposed new tax, Johnson favors 
“manipulative expansion” of key constitutional terms to circumvent 
the apportionment rule:30 “Given its rapid expansion, ‘excise’ should 
be understood as a malleable concept that a [c]ourt can use to avoid 
apportionment. . . . ‘[I]ncome,’ too, is a malleable concept that a court 
can use to avoid apportionment.”31 For Professor Johnson, almost 
 
 28. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), vacated by 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
 29. See Erik M. Jensen, The Constitution Matters in Taxation, 100 TAX NOTES 821, 827-
29 (2003) [hereinafter Jensen, Constitution Matters]; Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 
1107-28; Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct-Tax Clauses, 
15 J.L. & POL. 689, 707-08 (1999); Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 2375-77. 
 30. Calvin H. Johnson, Purging Out Pollock: The Constitutionality of Federal Wealth or 
Sales Taxes, 97 TAX NOTES 1723, 1734 (2002). 
 31. Id. at 1733. 
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every national levy is an “excise” (that is, an indirect tax), a “tax on 
incomes,” or maybe both—with no apportionment therefore required. 
In the passages I’ve quoted, Professor Johnson refers to courts as 
avoiding apportionment. If he is right, though, what this really means 
is that Congress can avoid apportioning taxes and not have to worry 
about being second-guessed by the judiciary. If the constitutional 
terms that seem to limit the taxing power are “inherently malleable,”32 
they mean what Congress wants them to mean. If Congress says a 
levy is an “excise,” Voila!, it’s an excise. Or if Congress says a levy is 
part of a “tax on incomes,” Voila!, it’s a tax on incomes. The key 
phrases are effectively treated like “public use” and “general wel-
fare”—terms that were once thought to have judicially enforceable 
content, but are now left to Congress to define.33 
And Professor Johnson takes his arguments about the insignifi-
cance of the constitutional limitations on the taxing power farther than 
(almost) any other man has gone before.34 Although the Hylton Jus-
tices understood the term “direct taxes” to include capitation and real-
estate taxes, as did all other founders of whom I’m aware, Professor 
Johnson suggests that real-estate taxes (and, more broadly, wealth 
taxes35) should today be exempt from apportionment because of a 
“more general intent” evidenced at the founding.36 Professor Johnson 
thinks that, in assuming a real-estate tax to be direct, the founders 
didn’t understand the logic of what they were doing. 
If the Direct-Tax Clauses don’t apply to real estate, only capita-
tion taxes remain subject to apportionment. And if by “capitation tax” 
we mean a lump-sum head tax, a capitation tax is automatically ap-
 
 32. See Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 101 (1990) (“[T]he 
common defense is an inherently malleable term the meaning of which must be left to the judg-
ment of Congress. The same should apply to the meaning of income in the sixteenth amend-
ment.”). 
 33. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 fn.2 (1987) (“The level of deference to 
the congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether ‘general 
welfare’ is a judicially enforceable restriction at all”) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-
91 (1976)); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239 (1984) (“‘[W]hen the legisla-
ture has spoken [in defining ‘public use’], the public interest has been declared in terms well-
nigh conclusive.’”) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). 
 34. One exception is Professor Ackerman, who also doesn’t like having the Constitution 
interfere with his policy goals. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 3 (“Under the constitutional re-
gime inaugurated by the New Deal, there are no significant limits on the national government’s 
taxing, spending, and regulatory powers where the economy is concerned—other than the re-
quirement that government compensate owners if their property is taken for public purposes.”). 
 35. In the agrarian society of the late eighteenth century, a real-estate tax was the quintes-
sential wealth tax. 
 36. Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of the 
Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 70 (1998) (“Even considering land tax a ‘direct 
tax’ makes the apportionment requirement contrary to the more general intent.”). 
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portioned anyway (since the special counting rules for slaves and In-
dians not taxed are no longer relevant).37 For Professor Johnson, the 
effect of the apportionment rule today is therefore zilch, and, with the 
Direct-Tax Clauses’ having no substantive effect, the Sixteenth 
Amendment is also irrelevant. 
III. INTERPRETING THE DIRECT-TAX CLAUSES 
Surprisingly little of the disagreement between Professor John-
son and me has been about substantive tax principles. We might be 
able to fit accelerated depreciation into our constitutional discussions, 
but that’s not going to happen here. Most of our discussion has in-
volved the proper interpretation of the constitutional provisions. 
I think the Direct-Tax Clauses were serious constitutional provi-
sions from the beginning, and they should be taken seriously today. 
Professor Johnson doesn’t. I think the Sixteenth Amendment should 
be understood as an important, but limited, carve-out from the Direct-
Tax Clauses. Professor Johnson disagrees about that, too. 
My starting proposition is that we should try to interpret any 
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision in its most robust 
form. At a minimum, that means resisting to the death the conclusion 
that a provision is meaningless and can therefore be ignored. If your 
method of interpretation leads you to conclude that a provision is 
nonsensical—and that’s effectively how Professor Johnson character-
izes the Direct-Tax Clauses: “a rule too silly to enforce”38—the ap-
propriate response is to reconsider the method, not to accept the ap-
parently nonsensical result. 
And there are two Direct-Tax Clauses in the Constitution. Some 
have argued that the Clauses therefore have extra effect,39 but we 
don’t need to go that far. At a minimum, the second reference to ap-
portionment makes it clear the rule wasn’t an afterthought or an obvi-
ous mistake.40 
 
 37. Even if a capitation tax could in theory be graduated, and Adam Smith made noises to 
that effect, the apportionment rule points toward a lump-sum head tax. See Jensen, Apportion-
ment, supra note 16, at 2392-93. 
 38. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1725. 
 39. See, e.g., Arthur C. Graves, Inherent Improprieties in the Income Tax Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution, 19 YALE L.J. 505, 515 (1910) (“The qualification of direct taxes is the 
only provision in the entire Constitution which appears twice in that instrument. This fact ought 
to teach us to hold it in still higher regard and to respect the more the earnestness and intent of 
the framers who placed it there.”). 
 40. The Clause in what became Article I, section 2 of the Constitution, tying apportion-
ment to both representation and direct taxation, was the subject of debate in July at the Conven-
tion. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 2386-89. But the second reference in section 
9 seems to have been for purposes of completeness, to ensure that apportionment was in the list 
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Professor Johnson would nonetheless have us conclude that two 
clauses in the Constitution should be interpreted in a way that de-
prives them of any significant effect. I’ll now consider, and reject, 
several of his justifications for interpreting the Direct-Tax Clauses so 
perversely: that the founders intended no significant limitations on the 
taxing power, that the Clauses are nonsensical in their operation, that 
the Clauses were inextricably linked to the odious system of slavery, 
and that we should defer to the founding-era Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of the Clauses in Hylton. On the last point I consider at 
length whether founding-era governmental bodies were generally 
scrupulous enough in observing constitutional niceties to deserve un-
critical reverence today. (The answer is “no.”) 
A. JOHNSON: “TAX WON” 
Creating a workable national revenue system after the debacle of 
the Articles of Confederation was a critical reason for having a new 
constitution, and, at the Constitutional Convention, Professor Johnson 
says, “Tax won.”41 The Constitution was a “pro-tax” document,42 and 
the founders therefore intended no significant limitations on the tax-
ing power (other than the Uniformity and Export Clauses). 
This is a point on which Professor Johnson and I don’t engage 
because we see the world of 1787-1789 so differently. Professor 
Johnson apparently views the Constitution-writing process as binary: 
taxes either won or lost, direct taxes either won or lost, the Federalists 
either won or lost. The intellectual battles in Philadelphia were all-or-
nothing, with the word “compromise” excised from delegates’ vo-
cabulary. 
But nothing in the record justifies Professor Johnson’s one-
dimensional interpretation of history. Properly understanding the 
Constitution doesn’t require that we choose between an unlimited (or 
nearly unlimited) taxing power and no taxing power at all. The Con-
stitution was intended to strengthen the national taxing power, but 
 
of limitations on congressional power. The language was added on the motion of George Read 
of Delaware near the end of the convention, on September 14, with no objection. Read was ap-
parently concerned the government might use the direct-tax power to disproportionately impose 
levies on states that had been delinquent under the requisitions system: “He was afraid that some 
liberty might otherwise be taken to saddle the States with a readjustment by this rule, of past 
Requisitions of Congs—and that his amendment by giving another cast to the meaning would 
take away the pretext.” MADISON, SEPT. 14, 1787, IN CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887, at 618 (Max Far-
rand ed.) (1911). 
 41. Calvin H. Johnson, Barbie Dolls in the Archeological Dig: Professor Johnson Re-
sponds, 100 TAX NOTES 832, 840 (2003). 
 42. Id. at 838. 
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let’s put this in perspective. The “national” government had had no 
power to tax individuals under the Articles of Confederation; all it 
could do was requisition funds from the states. For tax to “win” in 
Philadelphia, it wasn’t necessary to create an omnipotent taxing 
power. Tax “won” when the delegates agreed to something as simple 
as permitting the national government to levy duties on imports. 
Professor Johnson expects us to believe that “[n]o proponent of 
this Constitution could have tolerated a hobble on federal revenue,”43 
but that’s crazy. An awful lot of founders, including Federalists, in-
sisted on restraints that Professor Johnson says were intolerable. His 
slogans don’t even connect with the language of the Constitution, 
which includes the Uniformity Clause and the Export Clause as well 
as the two Direct-Tax Clauses—hobbles all. The constitutional con-
text, Professor Owen Fiss has properly noted, was “defined by the de-
sire to prevent abuses of the power of taxation,”44 and, without con-
straints on the national taxing power, the Constitution wouldn’t have 
been ratified. 
Tax’s victory wasn’t total, and direct taxation’s wasn’t either. 
Professor Johnson quotes many founders on the importance of the na-
tional government’s ability to impose direct taxes. For example, he 
notes that “Washington’s stubborn refusal to allow anything that goes 
to the prevention of direct taxation represents the Founders’ intent.”45 
True enough; in that respect direct taxation “won.” But the incontro-
vertible fact that the Federalists wanted the national government to 
have a direct-taxing power doesn’t mean that direct taxes were subject 
to no limitations. To repeat the obvious: the Direct-Tax Clauses are in 
the Constitution, twice, and they can’t be dispensed with just because 
they’re inconvenient. 
Finally, in tallying the results of the eighteenth-century tax wars, 
Johnson draws support for his expansive conception of the taxing 
power by noting that the Federalists generally “won” in Philadelphia 
and in the ratifying conventions and that the Anti-Federalists gener-
ally lost.46 Of course the final document conformed more closely to 
the desires of constitutional supporters than to constitutional detrac-
tors. Who could disagree? But constitution-writing isn’t an either-or 
process, and the “winners” didn’t get everything they wanted in undi-
luted form. 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 88-89 
(1993). 
 45. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1728. 
 46. See id. at 1727. 
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For example, the Federalists generally opposed the Export 
Clause, which prevents Congress from taxing “Articles exported.”47 
Among the formidable opponents were Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, Gouverneur Morris, George Washington, and James Wil-
son, but the Clause survived.48 And most Federalists didn’t think the 
taxing power should be unlimited: Madison thought the direct-tax ap-
portionment rule was “one of the safeguards of the Constitution.”49 
Even the strongest proponents of a powerful national government 
didn’t say in public that the government was to be unconstrained. 
Alexander Hamilton probably preferred an unlimited taxing power, 
and, in some passages in The Federalist, he suggested that only ne-
cessity, not constitutional language, should limit that power. But 
Hamilton was a realistic politician, who wanted the Constitution rati-
fied, and he also stressed protections against abuse.50 To say that the 
Federalists “won” isn’t to say that the Direct-Tax Clauses can be ig-
nored. 
B. BIZARRE RESULTS 
Professor Johnson is convinced that the founders didn’t under-
stand what they were doing with the Direct-Tax Clauses. He argues 
that they really didn’t want to limit the direct-taxing power at all, a 
proposition that is disproved by the very existence of the Clauses. But 
he has a more serious claim as well, that the founders unknowingly 
created a monster that, if given free rein, would devour Texas:51 “Ap-
portionment of direct tax turned out to be a rule too silly to enforce, in 
those cases in which the tax base is not equal per capita among the 
states.”52 Presented with two badly broken constitutional clauses that 
would inevitably have produced bizarre results, he says, the Hylton 
Court acted in a statesmanlike way by slaying the monster. The Court 
did what it had to do. 
If there were no way to make sense of the Direct-Tax Clauses, I 
might be sympathetic to Professor Johnson’s demand that the Clauses 
be discarded. If a provision has no discernable reason for existence or 
 
 47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
 48. See Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 15, at 6-15. 
 49. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1794) (describing why he was voting against the unappor-
tioned carriage tax later at issue in Hylton). 
 50. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Willis ed., 
1985) (“An actual census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule; a circumstance 
which effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this power of [real-
estate] taxation seems to have been provided against with guarded circumspection.”). 
 51. Let’s assume arguendo that that would be a bad thing. 
 52. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1725; see also id. at 1734 (“Apportionment is a silly and 
hobbling requirement, as the Founders recognized in Hylton, when the tax base is uneven.”). 
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if it just can’t work to effectuate any legitimate purpose, then I sup-
pose it has to go. But the founders weren’t inept, the Clauses had their 
purposes, and the Clauses work in a defensible (albeit clunky) way. 
Professor Johnson is correct, of course, that the founders didn’t 
understand all of the consequences of the provisions they created. The 
founders thought in general that the direct-tax apportionment rule 
would prevent abuse—it would make direct taxes geographically 
“fair,” among other things—but they didn’t prepare spreadsheets to 
study how the rule would work in a lot of hypothetical situations. Fur-
thermore, there probably was no consensus (there certainly wasn’t 
unanimity) about all of the taxes to which the Direct-Tax Clauses 
might apply. 
But the appropriate response to criticisms of that sort is “So 
what?” Any good (or bad) lawyer can create uncertainty in the inter-
pretation of any passage in any document. If unanimity were the crite-
rion, no provision discussed in Constitutional Commentary would 
have any effect. We do the best we can. 
The most often quoted passage from Madison’s notes in support 
of the idea that the founders were clueless is Rufus King’s unan-
swered question on August 20: “Mr King asked what was the precise 
meaning of direct taxation? No one answ[ere]d.”53 Although based on 
no evidence—who knows for sure why people don’t speak?— the 
conventional wisdom is that, as Dwight Morrow explained in 1910, 
“Rufus King’s question was not answered because no man in the 
Convention was able to answer it. He asked for a ‘precise’ definition 
of ‘direct taxation.’ As a matter of fact no man has yet satisfactorily 
answered that question.”54 
Morrow was a smart man, but most of us stop hoping for abso-
lute precision in the definition of legal terms after two weeks of law 
school. We certainly don’t discard terms just because our unrealistic 
hopes for precision are dashed. Besides, Morrow’s interpretation isn’t 
the only way to understand the silence that followed King’s question. 
Keith Dougherty has supplied a more plausible explanation: “Lack of 
discussion reflected the virtual consensus on the issue and perhaps the 
limited thought put into the details.”55 Yes, the founders punted on the 
 
 53. MADISON, AUG. 20, 1787, IN CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887, at 350 (Max Farrand ed.) 
(1911). 
 54. Dwight W. Morrow, The Income Tax Amendment, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 398 
(1910). 
 55. KEITH L. DOUGHERTY, COLLECTIVE ACTION UNDER THE ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION 151 (2001). We do know that, in other contexts, King acted as if he under-
stood the meaning of “direct taxes.” For example, at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, he 
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details—this was a Constitution they were writing—but they had a 
pretty good idea of what they wanted. 
Or did they? Because the founders hadn’t thought about the de-
tails, Professor Johnson says, they didn’t understand the absurdity of 
the apportionment rule. As I’ve noted, one of Johnson’s primary 
points is that “[a]pportionment of direct tax turned out to be a rule too 
silly to enforce, in those cases in which the tax base is not equal per 
capita among the states.”56 If the tax base isn’t distributed equally, 
rates will probably have to differ among the states, and who could 
have intended that?57 Just like the Justices in Hylton, Professor John-
son can conjure examples to make apportioned taxes look ridicu-
lous,58 preserving apportionment only when it is easy. 
But if apportionment applies only where the tax base is “equal 
per capita among the states,” as Professor Johnson argues, apportion-
ment applies only when it makes no difference. The rule is “enforced” 
when there’s nothing to enforce! Even with the Supreme Court’s 
blessing, that can’t be the right way to interpret a constitutional provi-
sion.59 
 
stated, “It is a principle of this Constitution, that representation and taxation should go hand in 
hand.” RUFUS KING, DEBATE IN THE MASSACHUSETTS RATIFICATION CONVENTION (1788), re-
printed in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES: THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, at 36 (Jonathan Elliot ed.) (1836). When King later 
spoke out against requisitions, he again seemed to know what he was talking about: 
The first revenue will be raised from the impost, to which there is no objection, the 
next from the excise; and if these are not sufficient, direct taxes must be laid. . . . [I]f 
we mean to support an efficient federal government, which, under the old Confedera-
tion, can never be the case, the pro posed [sic] Constitution is . . . the only one that can 
be substituted.  
Id. at 57. 
 56. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1725. 
 57. In Hylton, Justice Chase had written that 
[t]he Constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes, but only such as 
Congress could lay in proportion to the census. The rule of apportionment is only to 
be adopted in such cases, where it can reasonably apply; and the subject taxed, must 
ever determine the application of the rule. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174. 
Justice Iredell agreed: 
As all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident, that the Constitution contem-
plated none as direct, but such as could be apportioned. If this [carriage tax] cannot be 
apportioned, it is, therefore, not a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution.  
Id. at 181. 
 58. In Hylton, Justice Chase wrote: 
Suppose two States, equal in census, to pay 80,000 dollars each, by a tax on carriages, 
of 8 dollars on every carriage; and in one State there are 100 carriages and in the other 
1000. The owners of carriages in one State, would pay ten times the tax of owners in 
the other. A. in one state, would pay for his carriage 8 dollars, but B. in the other state, 
would pay for his carriage 80 dollars.  
Id. at 174; see also id. at 181-82 (Iredell, J.); Johnson, supra note 30, at 1725 (arguing, for ex-
ample, that, if apportionment were required with a carriage tax like that in Hylton, “the poor fool 
to drive the first carriage into Kentucky would have to bear Kentucky’s entire state quota”). 
 59. Professor Johnson approvingly quotes Alexander Hamilton’s argument in Hylton: 
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The apportionment rule, while cumbersome, has a core of good 
(or at least defensible) sense, as a limitation on the congressional 
power to enact sectionally burdensome taxes.60 For the founders, the 
possibility of taxes targeted at particular sections of the country 
wasn’t a trivial concern,61 and, by itself, the uniformity rule does 
nothing to prevent a tax directed at geographically concentrated items. 
Part—but only part—of the concern was slavery. The South was 
afraid that Congress might attack the peculiar institution by levying a 
tax on slaves, and the apportionment rule substantially lessened, if it 
didn’t eliminate, that possibility. Slaves were in fact taxed as part of 
several apportioned direct taxes on real estate,62 on the understanding 
that slaves were inextricably linked to the associated land, but no di-
rect tax was ever levied on slaves alone. 
The rule nevertheless has application to any sectionally concen-
trated tax base, not just to slaves. Suppose a tax is imposed on the 
ownership of sleighs. Although rates may be the same throughout the 
country, so that the uniformity rule is satisfied, only the North will 
bear the burden of the tax—unless the tax is direct. If the tax is direct, 
however, the burden must also fall on states with a sleigh deficit—
with the liability of any state dependent on its fraction of the national 
population, not the concentration of sleighs in that state. 
 Although Professor Johnson emphasizes that the apportion-
ment rule, if applied, could lead to bizarrely different tax rates in dif-
ferent states,63 his argument misses the point of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses. Professor Johnson correctly assumes that having different 
rates in different states will generally be seen as an absurdity, but it’s 
because the rule might lead to facially suspect results that the rule has 
effect. 
The Clauses should mean that, in ordinary circumstances, a di-
rect tax aimed at a sectionally concentrated tax base (that is, a base 
that isn’t at least approximately proportionate to population) won’t be 
enacted. Who in Congress is going to vote for such a tax, except per-
 
“[N]o construction ought to prevail calculated to defeat the express and necessary authority of 
the government.” Johnson, supra note 30, at 1726. But you can’t tell what the founders thought 
the necessary authority of the government was without considering the express limitations built 
into the Constitution. 
 60. It has other purposes as well, including the general desire to constrain national power. 
I focus on the sectional taxation point because it makes the good sense of the rule apparent. 
 61. See, e.g., Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 15, at 6-15 (2003) (noting that the primary 
purpose of the Export Clause was to prevent sectionally-targeted taxes on exports). 
 62. See supra note 4. 
 63. Indeed, depending on how the taxed items are distributed, it could lead to bizarrely 
higher rates in poorer states. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1725. 
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haps in an emergency like wartime, when revenue needs overwhelm 
other concerns? 
While you as congressman might initially be inclined to support 
a tax that seems to hit other states—let’s get those Montanans, heh, 
heh—it’s not as though you’re going to be able to do that secretly 
(and it’s not as though the Montana congressmen and others similarly 
situated are going to vote for the tax). And, if the proposed tax is di-
rect, it would wind up hitting your constituents as well: the appor-
tionment rule ensures that regardless of the distribution of the tax base 
across the country (and even if you have few sleighs in your state), 
your constituents would have to pay their apportioned share of the to-
tal liability. How are you going to defend a vote for such a statute on 
the floor of Congress, or to your constituents back home, or to anyone 
else? 
If Congress is inclined to use direct taxes at all (and even sup-
porters of direct taxation thought the United States would rely on in-
direct taxation in the ordinary course of its business),64 the appor-
tionment rule pushes Congress in the direction of implementing only 
those direct taxes that have uniformly distributed bases—“equal per 
capita among the states,” to use Professor Johnson’s phrase. If the 
base of a proposed direct tax is “equal per capita among the states,” 
the tax by definition will satisfy the apportionment rule, and it will be 
relatively easy to sell politically. For a sectionally concentrated tax 
base, however, the apportionment rule should help prevent enactment 
of the tax.65 
Professor Johnson would instead have the apportionment rule 
apply only if the tax base is uniformly distributed, when, by defini-
tion, there’s no danger of sectional taxation. And the rule, he says, 
should have no application to cases in which nominally uniform taxes 
have sectionally disproportionate effects. That’s backwards. 
Nothing that I have said means that direct taxation is impossible. 
We shouldn’t forget that Congress did in fact enact a number of ap-
portioned direct taxes on real estate between 1798 and 1861.66 Profes-
sor Johnson refers to the apportionment rule’s operating as a “tax kil-
ler,” to make direct taxation impossible,67 but these statutes, which 
included complex mechanisms to ensure compliance with the appor-
 
 64. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 2382-83. 
 65. One hopes that such a tax wouldn’t be enacted even without the apportionment rule, 
but the rule should clinch the case in the overwhelming majority of cases. 
 66. See supra note 18. You can tell from the dates (1798, 1813, 1815, 1816, and 1861) 
that these direct taxes were generally intended to raise revenue for war or the possibility of war. 
 67. Johnson, supra note 41, at 832. 
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tionment rule, prove him wrong. The apportionment rule, taken seri-
ously, makes direct taxation difficult, but not impossible. 
Perhaps one can find a constitutional provision that is so nonsen-
sical that it should be discarded for that reason, but the Direct-Tax 
Clauses don’t approach that standard of absurdity. One might disagree 
with the goal of cabining congressional power, or be indifferent to the 
purported dangers of sectional taxation, or find fault with the way the 
apportionment rule implements its goals in a particular case. But by 
no standard is the rule “too silly to enforce.” 
C. THE CONNECTION WITH SLAVERY 
Professor Johnson, Professor Ackerman, and others have pointed 
to the Direct-Tax Clauses’ unfortunate connection with slavery as a 
reason for jettisoning the Clauses. As Professor    Ackerman puts it, 
“there is no longer a constitutional point in enforcing a lapsed bargain 
with the slave power.”68 This is obviously supposed to be a discus-
sion-stopper: suggest that the Direct-Tax Clauses should be taken se-
riously, and you might be accused of indifference to slavery and ra-
cism.69 
Nonsense. I admit the obvious: the Clauses took the form they 
did, with the three-fifths counting rule for slaves, because of slavery. 
But the apportionment rule, which applies to representation as well 
as direct taxation, wasn’t pro-slavery. Unfortunately it wasn’t anti-
slavery either, but it wasn’t the unqualified evil that Professors Ac-
kerman and Johnson think it was. 
In his notes on the Constitutional Convention, James Madison 
described Gouverneur Morris’s proposal of “proportioning direct 
taxation to representation,” ultimately reflected in Article I, section 2, 
as having the “object [of] lessen[ing] the eagerness on one side, & the 
opposition on the other, to the share of Representation claimed by the 
S. <Sothern> [sic] States on account of the Negroes.”70 By tying ap-
portionment to both representation and direct taxation, the rule had 
the effect of increasing the South’s representation (by counting slaves 
as three-fifths of a person) but simultaneously increasing the South’s 
 
 68. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 58; see also id. at 31; Johnson, supra note 30, at 1724-25 
& 1734. 
 69. After my first article on this subject, Professor Ackerman accused me of defending the 
“legacy of racism.” See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 30 n.112. 
 70. MADISON, JULY, 24, 1787, IN CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887, at 106 n.* (Max Farrand ed.) 
(1911). As readers of Constitutional Commentary undoubtedly know, but the person on the 
street almost always gets wrong, it was the slave states that wanted slaves counted as full per-
sons for purposes of representation. 
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share of any direct-tax liability (also by counting slaves as three-fifths 
of a person).71 Any incentive the southern states might have had to 
overstate slave populations, so as to increase representation, would 
have come with a substantial cost: increased direct-tax liability. This 
was a compromise that worked because it fully satisfied neither side, 
and, viewed in its entirety, the compromise wasn’t pro-slavery. 
Madison discussed this point in Federalist 54. After noting that 
population would be used to govern both representation and direct 
taxation, he stressed that the rules are “by no means founded on the 
same principle.”72 The tension is a good thing: 
As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will 
necessarily depend . . . on the disposition, if not on the co-
operation of the States, it is of great importance that the States 
should feel as little bias as possible to swell or to reduce the 
amount of their numbers. . . . By extending the rule to both objects, 
the States will have opposite interests which will control and bal-
ance each other and produce the requisite impartiality.73 
The compromise reflected in the Direct-Tax Clauses worked precisely 
because it was neither pro-slavery nor anti-slavery. 
As a result of the Civil War Amendments, the Constitution was 
stripped of its most egregious connections with slavery, including the 
three-fifths rule. Discarding still other provisions because of a per-
ceived slavery taint, as Professors Johnson and Ackerman want us to 
do, would expose the Constitution to a seemingly endless series of 
challenges. Where do we stop if we start unraveling the compromises 
that had some arguable connection with slavery? Was provision A too 
closely tied to tainted provision B? How do we tell? And what about 
C, which at one point was discussed in connection with B? If all con-
stitutional provisions are up for grabs, one despairs of being able to 
invoke closure.74 
 
 71. Morris apparently didn’t want the apportionment rule for direct taxation to survive; he 
“meant it as a bridge to assist over a certain gulph; having passed the gulph the bridge may be 
removed.” MADISON, JULY, 24, 1787, IN CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887, at 106 (Max Farrand ed.) 
(1911) (footnote omitted). It survived nonetheless. 
 72. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 275 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Willis ed., 1985). 
 73. Id. at 279. 
 74. I don’t mean to suggest that the Constitution was so tainted that the entire document 
was irredeemable. I reject Justice Thurgood Marshall’s argument that Justice Taney’s opinion in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), accurately described the founders’ moral and con-
stitutional understanding of African-Americans. Compare Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on 
the Bicentennial of the Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987), with Erik M. Jensen, Com-
mentary: The Extraordinary Revival of Dred Scott, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1988). But in a docu-
ment reflecting a multitude of compromises, it is often impossible to determine which provi-
sions were tradeoffs for which. 
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With the apportionment rule, Professors Johnson and Ackerman 
might respond, we don’t have any difficulty figuring out what the 
compromise was. It’s right there in Article I, section 2, with the three-
fifths rule used both for direct taxation and for representation. But that 
fact hardly strengthens their case. Why is it that Professors Johnson 
and Ackerman see the taint of slavery on only one side of the com-
promise (and, for that matter, only on the side that imposed a cost on 
slave states)? What principle would permit us to view the apportion-
ment rule for direct taxation as irredeemably tainted, but not the ap-
portionment rule for representation, when the two rules are contained 
in precisely the same passage? 
I take it that Professors Johnson and Ackerman don’t favor re-
configuring representation in the House of Representatives because of 
the slavery taint, but why not? If we want to think in these terms—I’d 
prefer not to—the apportionment rule for representation was also part 
of a “lapsed bargain with the slave power.”75 The Johnson-Ackerman 
position seems to be result-oriented thinking at its worst: see a taint 
when you think it supports a result you want, and see no taint other-
wise. That isn’t a helpful canon of constitutional interpretation. 
Despite its tangential connection with slavery, the direct-tax ap-
portionment rule had independent reasons for existence, such as deter-
ring sectionally directed taxation. Given the founders’ fears of na-
tional taxing power, it’s hard to imagine that the Constitution would 
have included no limitations on direct taxation even if slavery had not 
existed. The dangers of sectional taxation didn’t begin with slavery 
and didn’t disappear with the end of slavery. Yes, the limitation actu-
ally selected took a peculiar form, but that’s not a reason for disre-
garding it. 
D. DEFERENCE TO THE FOUNDING “GIANTS”: THE UNDESERVED 
INFLUENCE OF HYLTON 
Perhaps Professor Johnson’s strongest argument for discounting 
the Direct-Tax Clauses is that the Supreme Court’s 1796 decision in 
Hylton v. United States76 demonstrates that, whatever language was 
used in the Constitution, the founders intended the Clauses to be 
toothless. In this part of the article, I’ll question the supposition that 
what the Court did in 1796 or, more generally, what founders-in-
power did defines the original understanding of the Constitution. 
 
 75. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 58. 
 76. 3 U.S. 171 (1796). 
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 1. Hylton 
In Hylton, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an unappor-
tioned carriage tax, enacted in 1794, against the challenge that the tax 
was direct.77 By any standard, Hylton was a great case—extraordinary 
drama in oral argument, with former Treasury Secretary Alexander 
Hamilton representing the government, the taxing power of the new 
nation at issue, and the Supreme Court facing for the first time the 
question whether it could overturn a congressional enactment on con-
stitutional grounds.78 
The conclusion about the carriage tax was important at the 
time—the tax was a significant revenue-raiser—but it was the side 
dishes that made Hylton a sumptuous feast. In two sets of dicta, the 
Hylton Justices concluded that apportionment should apply only when 
it’s easy to do (that is, when the tax base is uniformly distributed 
across the country),79 and that only capitation taxes and taxes on real 
estate are direct. In Justice Chase’s words, the direct taxes “contem-
plated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll 
tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other cir-
cumstance; and a tax on LAND.”80 Justice Iredell agreed: “In regard 
to other articles, there may possibly be considerable doubt.”81 While 
Justice Paterson was unwilling to concede that no other taxes could be 
direct, he too concluded that capitation and real-estate taxes were the 
“principal” examples.82 
Professor Johnson is a fervent defender of Hylton’s dicta.83 The 
Court in 1796 was made up of founders—“giants [who] walked upon 
the earth,”84 in Johnson’s phrase—and what they said in Hylton was 
unquestionably correct: those Justices “knew the Constitution far bet-
ter than we do.”85 Marjorie Kornhauser has stated the Hylton-as-
 
 77. See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45, (1 Stat. 373) 373-75. 
 78. Hylton doesn’t get the good press that Marbury v. Madison does because Hylton 
didn’t strike down the carriage tax. For the posture of the case to have made any sense, however, 
the Court must have concluded that it had the power to invalidate the tax. 
 79. See supra notes 20 and 58 and accompanying text. The assumption, without any data 
one way or the other, was that carriages weren’t uniformly distributed. 
 80. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 175. 
 81. Id. at 183. 
 82. Id. at 177. 
 83. It’s presumably only the dicta that matter to Professor Johnson. The Third Congress, 
also filled with giants, passed the carriage tax over complaints that it was direct. See DAVID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 185-86 
(1997). And George Washington signed the bill. Those who believe that whatever founders-in-
power did was constitutional don’t need the Supreme Court to conclude that the carriage tax was 
valid. 
 84. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1726. 
 85. Id. 
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gospel argument in this more restrained way: “The gap in time be-
tween Hylton and the Constitution is small, the flaw in the Articles of 
Confederation well-known. Also persuasive is the fact that four of the 
justices in the Hylton case had been drafters or ratifiers of the Consti-
tution.”86 
Of course we should care what the Supreme Court Justices wrote 
in their separate opinions in Hylton, and we should take those posi-
tions into account in trying to discern original understanding. The 
Hylton opinions are relevant data. The case is nevertheless grossly 
overrated for many, many reasons.87 
To begin with, I’m skeptical that the Hylton Justices knew the 
Constitution better than we do. They had firsthand knowledge of cer-
tain events, but they couldn’t bounce around the country to attend 
multiple ratifying conventions, and they didn’t have access to C-Span. 
We have available many primary sources that most members of the 
founding generation were unaware of. 
And why would we think that the Hylton Justices knew the Con-
stitution better than other founders? It’s not as though there was una-
nimity in constitutional interpretation, even among those who sup-
ported the Constitution. Representative James Madison, for example, 
voted against the carriage tax at issue in Hylton because he thought it 
would “break down one of the safeguards of the Constitution.”88 The 
Justices got the final say on the carriage tax, and threw in the dicta as 
well, but that was by reason of their power, not by power of their rea-
soning.89 
Most important, the Hylton Justices didn’t tie their dicta to the 
critical primary source—the Constitution itself. It’s more than a little 
peculiar to say we’re deferring to the “founders” by adopting an in-
terpretation that guts two constitutional provisions. If apportionment 
is to be applied only when it makes no difference, what’s the point of 
the Direct-Tax Clauses? (The Clauses were designed to create incen-
tives for Congress to impose only direct taxes with bases that are uni-
formly distributed, but that’s different from saying the rule should be 
applied only in that situation.) And if only two categories of taxes 
 
 86. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxa-
tion of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
 87. This is largely a discussion between proponents of an unlimited taxing power and 
those who see constraints on that power, but, amazingly, everyone apparently accepts the rele-
vance of original understanding to the resolution of that issue. 
 88. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1794). 
 89. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are not 
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”). 
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were involved, why didn’t the drafters just say that, rather than using 
the phrase “Capitation, or other direct, Tax” in Article I, section 9? 
What’s most bewildering about Hylton is that the dictum about 
capitation and real-estate taxes apparently leaves the Direct-Tax 
Clauses with no relevance to forms of taxation developed after 1787. 
Any unapportioned tax is constitutional just because the founders 
failed to mention it? That’s an absurd way to interpret a constitutional 
limitation.90 
There was obviously a lot going on in 1796 other than close legal 
reasoning. The early Supreme Court was very different from the type 
of Court we take for granted today. Rather than seeing the Court as a 
check on the other branches, the Hylton Justices (Federalists all) 
viewed their function as supporting the Federalist government.91 In-
deed, Hylton was so clearly a phony dispute, with manufactured 
“facts,” that it’s hard to see why the Court decided this case except to 
make a statement about Federalist power.92 
Whatever the Hylton Court said, we must test our interpretation 
of the Direct-Tax Clauses against the language and structure of the 
Constitution and against other founders’ understanding of the same 
provisions. On those grounds, the Hylton Court was wanting. And, as 
I shall now argue, it wasn’t just the Supreme Court in the early years 
of the Republic that played fast and loose with constitutional require-
ments. Whether it’s the 1790s or the twenty-first century, it isn’t a 
good idea to rely on those in power to define the limits of their 
power.93 
 
 90. This is a classic example of why dicta shouldn’t control in later cases: the Justices 
didn’t consider the effect of their statements on future taxes because they didn’t have to. But this 
example is even worse than usual because there was no one on the Court skeptical enough of 
congressional power to push the Justices to be more careful in their language. The practice of 
writing opinions seriatim also didn’t advance the cause of linguistic precision. 
 91. See William R. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE 
JOHN MARSHALL 292, 315 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) (noting that “justices of the early 
Supreme Court simply did not view their positions the way modern justices do”); Jensen, Taxing 
Power, supra note 16, at 1079 n.115. 
 92. Hylton claimed to have 125 carriages for his own use (more “than then existed in Vir-
ginia.” Edward B. Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 20 HARV. L. REV. 280, 283 
n.1 (1907)), because the threshold amount required for Supreme Court review was $2000 (125 
carriages with tax and penalties of $16 per carriage.) Even if believed, the phony claim 
shouldn’t have worked: for jurisdictional purposes, the dollar amount at issue was supposed to 
exceed $2000, see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, (1 Stat. 73) 84 and the parties had agreed 
that any liability of Hylton’s could be discharged for sixteen dollars. See Hylton, 3 U.S. at 172. 
 93. Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616 n.3 (1992) (“[P]ublic officials, no matter when 
they serve, can turn a blind eye to constitutional principle.”) (Souter, J., concurring). 
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 2. Early Legislative Practice 
Professor Johnson’s “giants” weren’t only on the Supreme Court 
in the 1790s; they were also in the executive branch and in Congress. 
We ought to be able to get an idea of the founders-in-power as inter-
preters of the Constitution by looking at legislation as well as adjudi-
cation. Everyone knows the insensitivities evidenced by the Alien and 
Sedition Acts,94 but they’re too easy. I’ll examine an early tax statute, 
from the Fifth Congress in 1797, to demonstrate what we should have 
known anyway: even with taxation, giants can act in constitutionally 
suspect ways.95 
First, some background: The Export Clause provides that “No 
Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”96 The 
Clause was an important part of the Constitution; without it, several 
southern states, worried that export levies might be targeted against 
the South, wouldn’t have supported the Constitution.97 And Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison used the Export Clause to 
defend the idea that “[i]n some cases . . . the constitution must be 
looked into by judges”: 98 
  It is declared that “no tax or duty shall be laid on articles ex-
ported from any state.” Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of 
tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judg-
ment to be rendered in such a case? ought the judges to close their 
eyes on the constitution, and only see the law?99 
Marshall wrote this in 1803, six years after the statute I’ll examine, 
but that’s beside my point. Marshall was stating the obvious: the Ex-
port Clause absolutely forbids certain forms of taxation. 
Chief Justice Marshall used easy cases to make the case for judi-
cial review, not to explicate the boundaries of the Export Clause. The 
doctrine of substance-over-form was known, at least at a rudimentary 
level, at the time of the founding; it’s hard to imagine that the Clause 
was intended to prohibit only the most obvious of export levies. In a 
later case under the Import-Export Clause,100 Marshall raised a hypo-
thetical that he thought had a clear answer: If exports can’t be taxed, 
 
 94. See Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, (1 Stat.) 577; Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, (1 Stat.) 
596. 
 95. The 1797 Act wasn’t just a nuts-and-bolts statute, of course. The extent of the taxing 
power was a serious issue in the late eighteenth century, and the 1797 Act was a serious reve-
nue-raiser at a time when war with France was possible. 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
 97. See Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 15, at 6-15. 
 98. 5 U.S. 137, 179 (1803). 
 99. Id. 
 100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
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could government instead tax exporters? “Would government be per-
mitted to shield itself from the just censure to which this attempt to 
evade the prohibitions of the constitution would expose it, by saying 
that [an occupational tax] was a tax on the person, not on the article, 
and that the legislature had a right to tax occupations?”101 Of course 
not. 
Congress in 1797 nevertheless approved “An Act laying Duties 
on stamped Vellum, Parchment and Paper,” titled to suggest that du-
ties were being laid on documents, rather than associated goods.102 At 
least three provisions in the Act were questionable when tested 
against the Export Clause’s prohibition against taxes on “Articles ex-
ported,” and one, dealing with taxes on bills of lading, was so clearly 
unconstitutional as to be laughable. 
  a. Taxes on Bills of Lading 
Among other things, the 1797 Act imposed a tax of ten cents on 
“[a]ny note or bill of lading, for any goods or merchandise to be ex-
ported, if from one district to another district of the United States, not 
being in the same State”; or, if the goods were “to be exported to any 
foreign port or place,” the tax was twenty-five cents.103 The Act thus 
taxed bills of lading for “goods to be exported to any foreign port or 
place” at a rate higher than that applicable to domestic bills. 
Careful drafting by giants? First, note the apparent assumption, 
reflected in the statutory language, that goods moving from one state 
to another are being “exported.” Many states maintained a sense of 
independence in the republic’s early years, but the understanding that 
interstate commerce involved exportation was almost certainly wrong 
in 1797. In any event, it long ago disappeared as a possible interpreta-
tion of the Export Clause.104 
More important, consider the merits of the tax. It was unques-
tioned that exported goods as such couldn’t be taxed. The tax on bills 
of lading wasn’t measured by the value or volume of exported goods, 
but that’s irrelevant for Export Clause purposes. A tax of ten cents per 
shipment of exported cotton is as invalid under the Clause as a tax of 
one cent per pound or a tax of one cent per dollar of assessed value.105 
 
 101. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 445 (1827). 
 102. Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, (1 Stat.) 527. 
 103. Id. at 528. 
 104. It’s now clear the reference is “only to exportation to foreign countries.” United States 
v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1, 13 (1915). 
 105. See Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 15, at 18-19. 
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Does a tax that clearly affects exportation become constitution-
ally acceptable if levied on paperwork associated with exported arti-
cles instead of on the articles themselves? To be sure, the late eight-
eenth century was a more formalistic time than today. The tax wasn’t 
challenged in court, and, when the 1797 Act was repealed after five 
years, it wasn’t because of perceived constitutional problems.106 In 
addition, as late as 1901, four Supreme Court Justices voted to uphold 
the constitutionality of such a tax.107 So maybe a tax on bills of lading 
wasn’t as blatant a violation of the Export Clause as a tax imposed di-
rectly on exported goods would have been. 
Maybe. But the 1797 tax was the equivalent of taxing the air sur-
rounding an exported article, and it doesn’t take much sophistication 
to see that if such a tax isn’t prohibited by the Export Clause, the 
Clause is a nullity. The Clause would prohibit only the most obvious 
sort of taxes, and thus give free rein to Congress to avoid its limita-
tions. The Fifth Congress legislated with the Clause in mind—
otherwise it simply would have taxed the goods—and it’s hard to see 
this part of the 1797 Act as anything other than a transparent attempt 
to circumvent the Clause. 
Indeed, that’s the way the Supreme Court later characterized a 
similar tax enacted in 1898. In the 1901 case of Fairbank v. United 
States,108 the Supreme Court considered a wartime stamp tax of ten 
cents on, among other things, “[b]ills of lading . . . for any goods, 
merchandise, or effects, to be exported from a port or place in the 
United States to any foreign port or place.”109 
Not surprisingly, the Court invalidated the 1898 tax in its appli-
cation to exports. Defending the tax, the government had argued that 
the actions of the Fifth Congress confirmed the constitutionality of 
levies of this sort. The Court disagreed: “[W]hen the meaning and 
scope of a constitutional provision are clear, it cannot be overthrown 
by legislative action, although several times repeated and never before 
challenged.”110 The substance of the tax was apparent: “a stamp duty 
on a bill of lading is in effect a duty on the article transported.”111 
 
 106. See Henry Carter Adams, Taxation in the United States 1789-1816, in JOHN HOPKINS 
UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE , SECOND SERIES V-VI 5, 57 (Her-
bert B. Adams ed., 1884) (“[U]pon the accession of Jefferson . . . , it was endeavored to change 
radically the financial policy of the United States. . . . [I]n 1802, all internal and direct taxes 
were abolished . . . .”). 
 107. See infra notes 108 and 110 and accompanying text. 
 108. 181 U.S. 283 (1901). 
 109. Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, (30 Stat. 448) 459 (Schedule A: Stamp Taxes). Bills of 
lading for domestic shipping were subject to only a one cent tax. Id. at 459. 
 110. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 312. 
 111. Id. at 294. 
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Fairbank echoed a similar point that Chief Justice Roger Taney had 
made in the 1860 case of Almy v. California:112 
[A] tax or duty on a bill of lading, although differing in form from 
a duty on the article shipped is in substance the same thing; for a 
bill of lading, or some written instrument of the same import, is 
necessarily always associated with every shipment of articles of 
commerce from the ports of one country to those of another.113 
Congress couldn’t burden exports through a tax on exported articles, 
and that’s exactly what it had done with the tax at issue in Fairbank, 
albeit surreptitiously. 
I find it hard to believe, but the government did convince four 
Justices in Fairbank that the tax was valid. Adopting an incredibly 
formalistic position, Justice Harlan wrote that “stamp duties were im-
posed specifically for and in respect of the vellum, parchment or pa-
per upon which was written or printed a bill of lading for goods or 
merchandise to be exported to foreign countries.”114 The dissenters 
cited the 1797 Act and a similar 1862 statute,115 neither of which had 
been challenged judicially, to support the idea that such a tax was 
constitutional.116 The dissenters had prior practice on their side, but 
common sense pointed in the other direction. 
If the 1797 tax on bills of lading was as blatantly defective as 
I’ve suggested, why didn’t someone challenge its constitutionality? 
The practice of running to the courthouse hadn’t yet been perfected in 
the late eighteenth century, but even if it had been, such a challenge 
would have been pointless. The judiciary, including the Supreme 
Court, was hopelessly beholden to the rest of the Federalist govern-
ment. Judicial silence on the constitutionality of all aspects of the 
1797 Act reflected nothing more than the strength of the ties that had 
been exhibited the year before in Hylton. 
  b. Taxes on Export Insurance 
It wasn’t just the tax on bills of lading that marred the 1797 Act. 
The Act contained other suspect provisions as well, including a stamp 
duty on 
 
 112. 65 U.S. 169 (1860) (interpreting the Import-Export Clause). 
 113. Id. at 174. 
 114. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 315 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 115. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, (12 Stat.) 432, continued by Act of June 30, 1864, (13 
Stat. 223) 291, repealed by Act of June 6, 1872, ch. 315, (17 Stat. 230) 256. 
 116. See Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 306-12. 
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any policy of insurance . . ., whereby any ships, vessels or goods 
going from one district to another in the United States, or from the 
United States to any foreign port or place, shall be insured, to wit, 
if going from one district to another in the United States, twenty-
five cents; if going from the United States to any foreign port or 
place, when the sum for which insurance is made shall not exceed 
five hundred dollars, twenty-five cents; and when the sum insured 
shall exceed five hundred dollars, one dollar.117 
The Fifth Congress knew the duty had export implications: if a ship 
carried exported articles, the insurance policy would relate, at least in 
part, to exported articles. 
The 1797 Act was evaluated by no contemporaneous court. But 
in 1915 the Supreme Court rejected a similar tax, as applied to ex-
ports, in Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v. United States,118 
and the 1915 Court didn’t seem to think the issues were difficult. Fur-
thermore, in 1996, in United States v. International Business Ma-
chines Corp.,119 yet another case involving a tax on export insurance, 
the Court backhandedly blessed Thames & Mersey by refusing to re-
consider its earlier decision.120 
As the Court said in 1915, and as Congress knew in 1797, ex-
porting valuable goods without insurance is almost inconceivable. In-
surance is “an integral part of the exportation.”121 Thames & Mersey 
concluded that the tax on insurance premiums was “so directly and 
closely related to the ‘process of exporting’ that the tax is in substance 
a tax upon the exportation.”122 
A tax on export insurance is a harder case under the Export 
Clause than a tax on bills of lading, but not by much.123 Nevertheless, 
in IBM, dissenting Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg wrote that the 
1797 Act should be given controlling weight in determining the origi-
nal understanding of the Export Clause, and therefore in evaluating 
the constitutionality of a similar modern tax on insurance: “We have 
always been reluctant to say a statute of this early origin offends the 
 
 117. Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, (1 Stat. 527) 527. 
 118. 237 U.S. 19 (1915). The tax applied to insurance “upon property . . . whether against 
peril by sea or on inland waters,” measured by the “amount of premium charged, one-half of one 
cent on each dollar or fractional part thereof.” Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, (30 Stat. 448) 461. 
 119. 517 U.S. 843 (1996). 
 120. For a full treatment of the Court’s bewildering treatment (really non-treatment) of im-
portant issues in IBM, see Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 15, at 17-35. 
 121. Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S. at 26. 
 122. Id. at 25. 
 123. Dissenting in IBM, Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg thought the two situations could be 
distinguished. See IBM, 517 U.S. at 876-77. 
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Constitution, absent clear inconsistency.”124 Besides, the IBM dissent-
ers noted, the Thames & Mersey Court was apparently unaware of the 
1797 Act and therefore might have decided the case differently if it 
had known what the Fifth Congress had done.125 
Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg were looking at early American 
history through rose-colored glasses. They rejected the idea that the 
Fifth Congress had been trying “to circumvent the Export Clause.” In 
their view, “[t]he early Congresses were scrupulous . . . by making 
specific exemptions for exports in laws imposing general taxes on 
goods. Their refusal to grant exporters similar exemptions from insur-
ance taxes indicates that those taxes were not viewed as equivalent to 
taxes on goods.”126 Yes, early Congresses were often scrupulous, but 
the Justices must not have studied the 1797 Act itself very carefully. 
Congress in 1797 tried to destroy the Export Clause, not to adhere to 
it. 
  c. Taxes on Charter Parties 
I’m not yet done with the 1797 Act. The Act included still an-
other provision with questionable status under the Export Clause, a 
tax of one dollar on “any charter-party”127—generally a contract for 
the lease of a vessel, which could include a lease for carrying cargo 
from the United States to foreign ports. Instead of imposing a tax di-
rectly on exported goods, Congress slapped a levy on ships carrying 
the goods, or, more precisely, on paperwork associated with the ar-
rangements for such ships. 
As was true with the other 1797 taxes, the constitutionality of a 
tax on charter-parties as it applied to exports wasn’t tested until much 
later. In 1915, the Supreme Court struck down a similar measure in 
United States v. Hvoslef,128 a companion case to Thames & Mersey.129 
 
 124. Id. at 875. 
 125. Id. at 877. 
 126. Id. at 876 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 51, (1 Stat. 199) 210-11 (tax on dis-
tilled spirits); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 51, § 14, (1 Stat. 384) 387 (tax on snuff and refined 
sugar)). Section 51 of the 1791 Act, for example, provided that 
if any of the said spirits [otherwise subject to the levy] shall, after the last day of June 
next, be exported from the United States to any foreign port or place, there shall be an 
allowance to the exporter or exporters thereof, by way of drawback, equal to the duties 
thereon, according to the rates in each case by this act imposed . . . . 
Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, (1 Stat.) 210; see also Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 51 § 14, (1 Stat. 
384) 387 (providing similar drawback). This was an example of scrupulousness. In fact, refund-
ing duties paid on spirits not earmarked for exportation at the time of distillation was more gen-
erous than modern understanding requires. See Jensen, Export Clause, supra note 15, at 60-63. 
 127. Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, (1 Stat. 527) 527. 
 128. 237 U.S. 1 (1915) (evaluating Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 6, (30 Stat. 448) 451, 
460). Section 6 of the Act specified that a tax be imposed on the “things mentioned and de-
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The Hvoslef Court thought this was a slam-dunk issue. It’s difficult to 
imagine anything more “integrally related” to exportation than con-
tracts to charter ships that will carry exported articles: “The charters 
were for the exportation; they serve no other purpose. A tax on these 
charter parties was in substance a tax on the exportation; and a tax on 
the exportation is a tax on the exports.”130 
At bottom, the Hvoslef Court concluded that it was necessary to 
reject a tax on charter parties if the Export Clause was to be protected: 
  This prohibition . . . is designed to give immunity from taxation 
to property that is in the actual course of such exportation . . . . 
This constitutional freedom, however, plainly involves more than 
mere exemption from taxes or duties which are laid specifically 
upon the goods themselves. If it meant no more than that, the ob-
structions to exportation which it was the purpose to prevent could 
readily be set up by legislation nominally conforming to the consti-
tutional restriction but in effect overriding it.131 
Just so. And it was just as true in 1797, when congressional “giants” 
threw a constitutional limitation to the winds. 
  d. Post-Mortem on the 1797 Act 
Nobody seems to care much about the Export Clause these 
days,132 but people did in the late eighteenth century. And unless we 
assume that the founders were so formalistic as to be mindless, the 
1797 Act was an obvious constitutional outrage. The Act demon-
strates that the founding generation was perfectly capable of bending 
constitutional rules beyond the breaking point. If one wanted to con-
tinue to trash the Fifth Congress (I think it’s lots of fun), one could 
find other constitutionally suspect provisions in the same piece of leg-
islation.133 
 
scribed in Schedule A,” and Schedule A included “charter party,” defined as a 
[c]ontract or agreement for the charter of any ship, or vessel, or steamer, or any letter, 
memorandum, or other writing between the captain, master, or owner, or person acting 
as agent of any ship, or vessel, or steamer, and any other persons or persons, for or re-
lating to the charter of such ship, or vessel, or steamer, or any renewal or transfer 
thereof . . . . 
Id. at 460; see Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 16. 
 129. As in Thames & Mersey, the 1915 Court wasn’t made aware of the similar provision 
in the 1797 Act. 
 130. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 17. 
 131. Id. at 13. 
 132. Except for the Supreme Court, which decided two cases under the Clause in the 
1990s, both times striking down federal taxes as they applied to exportation. See United States 
v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996); United States v. United States 
Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998). 
 133. For example, the Act included a legacy tax, a stamp tax for 
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Perhaps I’m being too harsh on the Fifth Congress and on foun-
ders-in-power more generally. Maybe the giants simply misunder-
stood the limitations of the Export Clause (and maybe the Hylton Jus-
tices simply misunderstood the significance of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses). I don’t think so, but genuine misunderstandings can happen. 
A misunderstanding is still a misunderstanding, however, no matter 
how genuine, and there’s no reason to defer to the genuine misunder-
standings of prior generations. 
 3. How Hylton Does Matter: Taxes on Real Estate (and Other 
Items of Wealth) 
I’ve been arguing that the deference shown over the years to 
Hylton has been misguided, and, more generally, that we shouldn’t 
take actions of founders-in-power as incontestably defining original 
understanding. One final point before moving to the Sixteenth 
Amendment: Professor Johnson has argued that we should step back 
to try to discern a “more general intent” of the founders.134 Had they 
only known how unworkable the apportionment rule was, Professor 
Johnson says, they would have concluded that taxes on real estate 
should not be subject to apportionment. Hylton’s dicta didn’t go far 
enough in gutting the Direct-Tax Clauses. 
This point is important because Professor Johnson uses it to ar-
gue that wealth taxes, properly understood, shouldn’t have been con-
sidered direct taxes by the founders. If that’s right, an unapportioned 
tax on wealth would be permissible today, whether or not a wealth tax 
would qualify as a “tax on incomes” under the Sixteenth Amend-
ment.135 
 
any receipt or other discharge for or on account of any legacy left by any will or other 
testamentary instrument, or for any share or part of a personal estate divided by force 
of any statute of distributions, the amount whereof shall be above the value of fifty 
dollars, and shall not exceed the value of one hundred dollars, twenty-five cents; 
where the amount thereof shall exceed the value of one hundred dollars and shall not 
exceed five hundred dollars, fifty cents; and for every further sum of five hundred dol-
lars, the additional sum of one dollar. 
Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, (1 Stat. 527) 527. Estate taxes and inheritance taxes are today 
assumed not to be direct taxes, but that’s partly because the Supreme Court cited the 1797 Act 
as support for the constitutionality of such an unapportioned tax. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 
U.S. 41, 56 (1900) (finding support in the 1797 Act for congressional power to enact an unap-
portioned estate tax). 
 134. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 70. 
 135. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1728-29. Professor Ackerman also concludes that an 
unapportioned tax on real estate would be permissible, but not because of original understanding 
or any attempt to divine the meaning of “taxes on incomes.” Instead, 
[s]ince the epic struggle between Franklin Roosevelt and the Old Court, the judiciary 
has consistently upheld democratic efforts to take control of the economy in pursuit of 
social justice. Under the constitutional regime inaugurated by the New Deal, there are 
no significant limits on the national government’s taxing, spending, and regulatory 
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But that isn’t a position that can be reconciled with any reason-
able conception of original understanding. It’s true, as Professor 
Johnson argues, that the founders understood taxation of wealth to be 
within congressional power.136 (All direct taxes were within Con-
gress’s power.) As far as I can tell, however, everyone who discussed 
direct taxes in the Constitutional Convention or in state ratifying con-
ventions conceded that a tax on real estate would be a direct tax. The 
Justices in Hylton certainly thought that to be the case.137 Congress 
could impose a wealth tax, but to do so, it would have to apportion the 
tax. 
Professor Johnson tries to have it both ways with Hylton. He 
cites the case as the incontrovertibly correct product of “giants” when 
it stands for a position he likes (that apportionment should be required 
only when it makes no difference). He ignores the same “giants” 
when they say something he dislikes (that an unapportioned tax on 
wealth is a direct tax). Moreover, in the cases between Hylton and 
Pollock, which Professor Johnson characterizes as correctly holding 
that the Direct-Tax Clauses didn’t limit the taxes at issue, the Su-
preme Court assumed that a real-estate tax was a direct tax.138 
There’s no reason to look for a more general intent in interpret-
ing a provision when we have absolute proof that the founders 
thought that a tax on real-estate was direct. Even if you think it’s in-
tellectually anomalous to constrain taxes on real estate, that’s not a 
justification for ignoring provisions intended to do just that. I reject 
treating Hylton as a definitive interpretation of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses, but the alignment between Hylton and evidence from other 
sources should leave no doubt about the characterization of a tax on 
real estate. 
Further evidence that the founding giants considered a real-estate 
tax to be direct can be found in legislation. In 1798, Congress passed 
the first of several national taxes on real estate, and Congress appor-
tioned the tax, using a complex mechanism to satisfy the apportion-
ment rule.139 If the behavior of early Congresses reflects the original 
 
power where the economy is concerned—other than the requirement that government 
compensate owners if their property is taken for public purposes. 
Ackerman, supra note 3, at 3. I’ll let others assault the proposition that “constitutional mo-
ments” amend the Constitution. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY 
SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 109-16 
(2002). 
 136. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1728-29. 
 137. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra note 21. 
 139. See Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, (1 Stat.) 597. 
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understanding, as is often argued, then clearly a real-estate tax is di-
rect. 
My use of congressional behavior is not inconsistent with my 
criticism of the 1797 taxing statute. There’s a difference between re-
lying on an early determination that Congress was bound by constitu-
tional limitations, as I’m doing here, and using a congressional en-
actment like the 1797 Act to “prove” that constitutional limitations 
don’t apply. We can trust legislative bodies when they see limitations 
on their power (particularly when they’re acting in a way consistent 
with other evidence of original understanding) much more readily 
than we can trust legislative bodies that purport to see no limitations. 
A skeptic might respond that Congress wasn’t necessarily indi-
cating any particular understanding of constitutional requirements 
with the 1798 real-estate tax; maybe it was just acting cautiously by 
providing for apportionment. Congress doesn’t have to exercise its 
full taxing power, of course, so what a cautious Congress does isn’t 
controlling and may not even be helpful in determining the bounda-
ries of congressional power. 
That can’t be what was going on in 1798, however. With the way 
the apportionment and uniformity rules are set up, there was no “cau-
tious” position for Congress to take. The two rules are mutually ex-
clusive: one rule or the other must apply to any particular tax, and a 
tax can’t satisfy both rules simultaneously (except in the unlikely 
event that the tax base is distributed proportionately to state popula-
tions). To do its constitutionally mandated job, Congress must deter-
mine whether a tax is direct because it must decide whether the tax 
must be apportioned or whether it must be uniform. Congress in 1798 
had to determine whether a tax on real-estate was direct, and it made 
that determination consistent with the pervasive understanding of the 
time. 
* * * * * 
Not all of the founders were power-grabbers, of course, and not 
all of the actions of early governmental bodies were constitutionally 
suspect. In this discussion of Hylton and the 1797 Act, my point is 
only that there’s no reason to think that founders-in-power were right 
in constitutional interpretation merely because they were “giants.” In 
trying to discern the original understanding of the Direct Tax Clauses, 
we need to look at original sources more broadly—including the lan-
guage of the Constitution itself—and to look for a meaning that gives 
the Clauses effect. Professor Johnson hasn’t done that; I think I have. 
An interpretation that treats direct taxes as levies without indirect 
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taxes’ built-in protections against governmental abuse gives substance 
to the Clauses within the constitutional structure. 
IV. THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT 
To this point, I’ve been defending the significance of the Direct-
Tax Clauses. If those Clauses have no effect, then we have no need to 
parse the language of the Sixteenth Amendment. An exemption from 
the direct-tax apportionment rule is irrelevant if the apportionment 
rule is meaningless today. 
For the remainder of this article, I’ll assume that my argument 
has been right so far and that the Direct-Tax Clauses were intended to 
be significant limitations on the taxing power, far more significant 
than the Hylton Court suggested. I’ll also assume that Pollock was 
rightly decided. There’s a lot in the Pollock opinions that is embar-
rassing, but the result was right. The 1894 income tax wasn’t an indi-
rect tax—it wasn’t shiftable and therefore avoidable—and, without 
the characteristics of indirect taxes, an income tax was potentially 
dangerous. Notwithstanding Hylton’s dicta, the income tax should 
therefore have been subject to the apportionment rule.140 In fact, if 
one of the reasons for the rule was to discourage sectionally directed 
taxes, the income tax in 1894 was Exhibit A: given the concentration 
of wealth in the industrialized Northeast, the 1894 tax was clearly di-
rected at one section of the country. Indeed, Populists reveled in the 
sectional effects of the income tax.141 
A. INTERPRETING “TAXES ON INCOMES” 
With those assumptions, the interpretive question for the Six-
teenth Amendment should be straightforward: What sorts of taxes did 
the Amendment remove from the otherwise applicable rule requiring 
apportionment of direct taxes? 
For Professors Johnson and Ackerman, however, that question 
doesn’t matter. In their view, the Amendment wasn’t necessary from 
a technical standpoint. Pollock was so clearly wrong that Congress 
should have been able to enact another unapportioned income tax 
without tinkering with the Constitution.142 At the turn of the twentieth 
century, a number of congressmen thought that as well. They argued 
in favor of enacting a new income tax, expecting that the Supreme 
 
 140. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, 
at 1077-79. 
 141. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 1095-107. 
 142. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1731-33; Ackerman, supra note 3, at 31. 
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Court would reverse direction in the inevitable challenge and overturn 
Pollock.143 
It nevertheless eventually became clear to income-tax supporters 
that there could be no unapportioned income tax without a constitu-
tional amendment. For congressmen who thought Pollock was defen-
sible—and their numbers were almost certainly larger than Professors 
Johnson and Ackerman think—there was no alternative to amending 
the Constitution. But even congressmen who thought an amendment 
unnecessary were nervous about offending the Supreme Court by en-
acting a new tax without constitutional protection.144 (Besides, there 
was no guarantee that the Court would overrule Pollock.145) As Pro-
fessors Johnson and Ackerman see things, Pollock-skeptics outnum-
bered those who thought the case was rightly decided, and the 
Amendment merely made it politically possible to enact a new in-
come tax. 
Professors Johnson and Ackerman go even further. They argue 
that the Amendment was drafted to show congressional disdain for 
the Supreme Court’s determination in Pollock and to return the con-
stitutional understanding to the pre-Pollock era, when at most capita-
tion and real-estate taxes were governed by apportionment. They 
stress that Congress, in assembling the resolution that became the Six-
teenth Amendment, carefully chose language to show that it didn’t 
accept Pollock and that an expansive conception of “direct taxes” was 
wrong. 
That’s an interesting idea, but it isn’t necessarily relevant to con-
stitutional analysis—why should we care what Congress in 1909 
thought about the constitutional merits of Pollock?146 It also bears no 
apparent relationship to reality. There’s no evidence whatsoever that 
the language of the Sixteenth Amendment was crafted to repudiate 
 
 143. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1109-14. 
 144. See 44 CONG. REC. 3936 (1909) (statement of Cal. Sen. Frank P. Flint reporting on the 
decision of the Senate Finance Committee to recommend a constitutional amendment: “We felt 
that, in view of the decision . . . in the Pollock case, it would be indelicate, at least, for the Con-
gress of the United States to pass another measure and ask the Supreme Court to pass upon it, 
when they had already passed upon the proposition . . . .”). There’s also evidence that some who 
“supported” a constitutional amendment, rather than a new statute, thought an amendment 
wouldn’t be ratified. They hoped to destroy the idea of an income tax while apparently endors-
ing it. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1112-14. 
 145. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1109-14. 
 146. We’re as well-equipped to evaluate the merits as a bunch of congressmen were. Be-
sides, the congressmen who thought Pollock was wrong (and there were many, I concede) 
weren’t going back to first principles. They were restating what had become conventional wis-
dom before Pollock, and, not coincidentally, arguing that congressional power should be uncon-
strained. “We can do what we want” is a position you’d expect most congressmen to take on 
almost any issue. 
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Pollock except in the most obvious way, by making it possible to 
have a tax on incomes without apportionment.147 
It’s always a good idea to start the interpretive process with con-
stitutional language. Nothing in the text of the Sixteenth Amendment 
suggests the far-reaching consequences that Professors Johnson and 
Ackerman see. Pollock had invalidated an income tax because it 
hadn’t been apportioned, and the Amendment on its face makes it 
possible to have a “tax on incomes” without apportionment. As Pro-
fessor Fiss has noted, the Amendment “simply removed what ap-
peared to be a technical objection or impediment that Pollock had 
posed to the income tax.”148 It exempted one category of taxes from 
apportionment, nothing more. 
And that was quite enough. It’s not as though dealing with Pol-
lock in this technical way was trivial. In fact, the practical conse-
quences of the Sixteenth Amendment were so far-reaching—the per-
sonal income tax is an incredible revenue-raiser—that it’s hard to see 
why anyone would feel the need to look for still broader effects. 
Think of the politics of the early twentieth century: If you wanted to 
make an unapportioned income tax possible (and a majority of con-
gressmen wanted to do just that), and if you thought that a constitu-
tional amendment was going to be politically necessary to get that re-
sult, what would you try to do? Draft an amendment as broadly as 
possible so as to increase the likelihood of resistance? Or draft a nar-
row amendment that unquestionably made an unapportioned income 
tax possible? The answer should be obvious. 
Professors Johnson and Ackerman also can’t identify any legisla-
tive history to support their counterintuitive interpretation. The final 
language of the Amendment wasn’t hammered out on the floors of the 
Houses of Congress, with recorded debates to guide us as to what was 
happening. The language was drafted in closed sessions of the Senate 
Finance Committee, a committee controlled by Pollock-friendly Re-
publicans and chaired by Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, no 
fan of the income tax.149 We don’t know exactly what happened, but 
it’s incredible to think that these folks were trying to devise language 
to undercut Pollock’s broad rationale. 
Both Professors Johnson and Ackerman attach great significance 
to the fact that the Finance Committee removed a reference to “direct 
 
 147. See generally Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1091-129. 
 148. FISS, supra note 44, at 100. 
 149. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1119. Aldrich was one of those nominal 
“supporters” of a constitutional amendment who probably hoped to use the process to kill the 
income tax. See supra note 144. 
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taxes” from a draft resolution. There’s no evidence, however, that the 
deletion was intended to signal a repudiation of Pollock. If anything, 
the change points in the opposite direction. 
Senator Norris Brown’s original language for what became the 
Sixteenth Amendment provided that “Congress shall have power to 
lay and collect direct taxes on incomes” without apportionment 
among the several States according to population.150 As the resolution 
came out of the Finance Committee, the Amendment made no spe-
cific reference to direct taxation: “The Congress shall have power to 
lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several States and without regard to 
any census or enumeration.”151 According to Professor Johnson, 
“[t]he change, rejecting Brown’s language, is relevant evidence that 
Congress, in proposing the amendment, did not mean to treat the in-
come tax as direct, and did not mean to make taxes that fell just out-
side the definition of income, as taxes that failed for want of appor-
tionment.”152 
Professor Ackerman extends the argument, accusing Senator 
Brown of a “clever verbalism.” Brown, he says, aimed “to transform 
this tactical retreat [having to amend the Constitution to make an in-
come tax possible] into a long-run conservative victory” by conceding 
the direct character of income taxes, thereby “explicitly endorsing the 
Pollock majority’s vast expansion of the concept” of direct taxes.153 
When new language emerged from the Finance Committee, it was 
a major retreat from Brown’s conservative ambitions. Gone was 
[Brown’s] express vindication of Pollock’s decision to expand the 
category of “direct” taxation; in its place we find an explicit repu-
diation of Pollock’s effort to expand the category by insisting that 
an income tax, from whatever source derived, should be immune 
from the rule of apportionment.154 
The Committee drafters, Professor Ackerman says, “took special ef-
forts to avoid freezing Pollock’s doctrine concerning the scope of the 
‘direct tax’ clauses.”155 The language “had been revised to eliminate 
all explicit endorsement of Pollock’s reasoning.”156 
 
 150. S.J. Res. 25, 61st Cong., 44 CONG. REC. 1568 (1909). 
 151. S.J. Res. 40, 61st Cong., 44 CONG. REC. 3900 (1909). 
 152. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1733. 
 153. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 37. 
 154. Id. at 38. 
 155. Id. at 51 (emphasis deleted). 
 156. Id. at 38. 
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I have no idea where any of that comes from. There are no his-
torical documents that support any of these suppositions, nothing to 
show “explicit repudiations” and “special efforts” in committee. If 
anything, the change in the language of the Brown resolution points in 
the opposite direction. The resolution hinted that there might be some 
income taxes that aren’t direct (there are “direct taxes on incomes” 
but also therefore indirect taxes on incomes). If a congressman 
wanted to make it clear that Pollock was rightly decided, that an in-
come tax is ipso facto a direct tax, he would have wanted to change 
Brown’s language. In short, it’s far more plausible to read the 
Amendment as a vindication rather than a repudiation of Pollock.157 
In any event, the term used in the Amendment proper is “taxes 
on incomes,” which doesn’t come close to supporting the idea that the 
pre-Pollock understanding was to be resuscitated or, more broadly, 
that all direct taxes (except maybe capitation taxes) were to be ex-
empted from apportionment. In fact, the Senate explicitly considered 
and rejected proposals to do just that. Before the Brown resolution 
had been sent to committee, Senator Anselm McLaurin of Mississippi 
argued that because the impediment Congress faced was the Direct-
Tax Clauses, Congress should strike out the references to direct taxes 
and leave apportionment to apply only to capitation taxes. Doing so 
would “accomplish all that [Brown’s] amendment proposes to ac-
complish and not make a constitutional amendment for the enacting 
of a single act of legislation” [the income tax].158 Senator Brown re-
fused the apparently friendly amendment, however: “That may be 
true, Mr. President; but my purpose is to confine it to income taxes 
alone, and to forever settle the dispute by referring the subject to the 
several States.”159 
After the resolution had been reported by the Finance Commit-
tee, with much of the language changed but with the reference to 
“taxes on incomes” intact, Senator McLaurin again suggested it 
would be better to amend the Constitution to delete references to “di-
rect taxes.”160 McLaurin said that his proposal would “eliminate from 
the Constitution every cause of contention over the question of the au-
thority of Congress to levy an income tax, except as to the power of 
Congress to grade an income tax.”161 And he was worried that by 
passing a resolution applicable only to income taxes, Congress might 
 
 157. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1120. 
 158. 44 CONG. REC. 3377 (1909). 
 159. Id. (emphasis added); see Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1120-21 (discuss-
ing why Brown might have wanted to limit the scope of the Amendment). 
 160. See 44 CONG. REC. 4067 (1909); 44 CONG. REC. 4109 (1909). 
 161. 44 CONG. REC. 4109 (1909). 
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be seen as “recogniz[ing] the income tax as a direct tax.”162 Once 
again, however, McLaurin’s proposal went nowhere. The Amendment 
was limited in its language, and it was intended to be that way. 
With the language of the Amendment as ratified, and with no 
evidence that the Amendment was intended to eliminate the appor-
tionment rule for anything except “taxes on incomes,” we have to in-
terpret that term as given. We can’t duck the responsibility of deter-
mining whether a tax is direct to begin with and, if so, whether it’s an 
income tax. Within the universe of “direct taxes,” only “taxes on in-
comes” are exempt from apportionment. 
I can’t promise a precise definition of “taxes on incomes,” but I 
can suggest a couple of categories that don’t qualify—direct-
consumption taxes and wealth taxes. I’ve argued elsewhere that the 
determination of what constitutes a “tax on incomes” should be in-
formed by the debates that led to the adoption of the 1894 income tax, 
and, after the Supreme Court struck down that tax as unconstitutional, 
by the process that culminated in the Sixteenth Amendment. Those 
debates make it clear that the proponents of an income tax and the 
proponents of the Amendment saw income taxes and consumption 
taxes as fundamentally different levies.163 
Before the modern income tax, the national government relied 
almost entirely for revenue on indirect consumption taxes (tariffs and 
excises), which had increasingly come to be seen as unfair. The point 
of the push for income taxation was to rechannel the national gov-
ernment’s historical reliance on consumption taxes, not to validate 
new, direct forms of consumption taxes. If an unapportioned con-
sumption tax is direct—and some modern proposals for direct-
consumption taxes would be “direct” for constitutional purposes—it 
would have to be a “tax on incomes” to be constitutional. Given the 
history of the Sixteenth Amendment, I’m skeptical that a consumption 
tax would qualify. 
Nor does the history of the Amendment support the proposition 
that a wealth tax ought to be characterized as a “tax on incomes.” 
(There’s no doubt that a tax on wealth was originally understood to be 
a direct tax.164 If an unapportioned tax on wealth would be constitu-
tional today, it has to be because of the Sixteenth Amendment.165) 
There were certainly congressmen at the time who characterized the 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. See generally Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1100-02 & 1124-26. 
 164. See supra Part III.D.3. 
 165. As an alternative to his primary argument that a wealth tax isn’t direct, Professor 
Johnson also argues that a wealth tax ought to be characterized as a “tax on income.” See John-
son, supra note 30, at 1733. 
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income tax as an attack on concentrations of wealth. But the con-
gressmen were talking about imposing taxes on the wealthy through 
an income tax, not about levying taxes measured by the value of the 
wealth itself.166 
It would have made no sense for income-tax proponents to draft 
the Amendment in a broader way than necessary. If a property tax 
might have been understood to be a “tax on incomes,” that could only 
have complicated prospects of ratification. Getting authority for an 
unapportioned income tax was an extraordinary expansion of the na-
tional revenue power as it was. The need for still other forms of taxa-
tion wasn’t apparent then, and it’s not apparent now. 
* * * * * 
Not every direct tax is a “tax on incomes” automatically exempt 
from apportionment because of the Sixteenth Amendment. A con-
scious decision was made to limit the Sixteenth Amendment’s scope 
to “taxes on incomes.” All that the Amendment did—all that it was 
intended to do—was to enable an unapportioned income tax. 
B. THE CONTEMPORANEOUS UNDERSTANDING  
OF THE AMENDMENT 
The understanding that the Sixteenth Amendment exempts only 
a discrete category of taxes—”taxes on incomes”—from apportion-
ment isn’t something I’m making up. It reflects the language and his-
tory of the Amendment, and it was also the understanding of courts 
and Congress after ratification. 
 1. The Courts 
For the first two decades after ratification, the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Sixteenth Amendment as requiring careful consideration 
of whether a tax that would otherwise be subject to apportionment 
might be a “tax on incomes.” 
When the original understanding of the Direct-Tax Clauses is at 
issue, Professor Johnson and other proponents of a nearly unlimited 
taxing power tell us that what the Supreme Court said in Hylton, de-
cided seven years after the ratification of the Constitution, was defini-
tive. The Federalist Justices said almost exactly what Professor John-
son wants to hear, and we’re therefore told that the Court understood 
the recently drafted constitutional language better than we can. 
 
 166. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1128-29. 
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In contrast, no one seems to care about what the Supreme Court 
said in interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment. There were Court deci-
sions interpreting the Amendment within seven years of ratification, 
but Professor Johnson and friends don’t think we should pay attention 
to those cases. Why don’t we treat those Justices as among the “gi-
ants” of the Amendment? 
I guess we don’t do that because those old decisions assumed 
that the term “taxes on incomes” had content, that the Amendment 
wasn’t a complete repudiation of the Direct-Tax Clauses, and that not 
every unapportioned tax that Congress might have characterized as a 
tax on incomes was automatically valid. The Court viewed the 
Amendment quite differently from Professor Johnson, who argues 
that “‘income’ . . . is a malleable concept” that can mean what Con-
gress and the courts want it to mean.167 
The big case is Eisner v. Macomber,168 in which the Court in 
1920 considered whether Congress’s inclusion of totally proportion-
ate stock dividends within the base of an unapportioned income tax 
was constitutional. Macomber, who had received a stock dividend 
that didn’t change her interest in the distributing corporation, argued 
that the dividend wasn’t “income” and therefore wasn’t exempted 
from apportionment by the Sixteenth Amendment. With Pollock still 
on the books, the tax on the dividend was direct. If the tax wasn’t on 
“incomes,” it had to be apportioned. 
Of the nine Justices sitting in Macomber, seven took Mrs. 
Macomber’s argument seriously. The five-man majority, in an opin-
ion by Justice Pitney, concluded that a totally proportionate stock 
dividend wasn’t “income”: it did nothing more than cut up the already 
existing corporate pie into more pieces, keeping every shareholder’s 
fraction unchanged.169 The Court and Macomber understood, as Yogi 
Berra didn’t, that it makes no difference whether you cut your pizza 
into four or eight slices if you consume the whole thing yourself. 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Brandeis (joined by Justice Clarke) 
offered reasons why stock dividends could be treated as income and 
could therefore properly be included in an income-tax base. Like the 
majority, however, Justice Brandeis accepted the proposition that the 
term “incomes” had content. Although congressional power was to be 
“liberally construed,”170 the Amendment wasn’t intended to permit 
Congress to avoid apportionment simply by characterizing an item as 
 
 167. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1733. 
 168. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
 169. Id. at 210-11. 
 170. Id. at 226 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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income. Indeed, Justice Brandeis noted in a later case that “Congress 
cannot make a thing income which is not so in fact.”171 
Macomber wasn’t aberrational. In two other cases decided dur-
ing the 1920s, Weiss v. Stearn172 and Edwards v. Cuba Railroad 
Co.,173 the Court rejected taxes on the ground that the taxes were di-
rect and didn’t fit the Amendment’s definition of “taxes on in-
come.”174 Many other cases took it for granted that the term “taxes on 
incomes” had enforceable content.175 
For many modern commentators, however, only one opinion in 
Macomber really matters, that of Justice Holmes (joined by Justice 
Day), who thought the whole issue was silly. In a line quoted by both 
Professors Johnson and Ackerman, Holmes wrote that “[t]he known 
purpose of the Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what 
might be direct taxes.”176 According to Professor Johnson, Justice 
Holmes “showed his wisdom” by that comment.177 
Justice Holmes didn’t explicitly say that the Direct-Tax Clauses 
were no longer relevant. His opinion is cursory—”giants” don’t have 
to explain—but it’s conceivable that he meant only that the Clauses 
should return to their meaning before Pollock, with the relatively eas-
ily identified categories of capitation and real-estate taxes still subject 
to apportionment.178 
That interpretation would have been questionable enough, but 
let’s suppose Justice Holmes meant, as many commentators assume, 
that the Sixteenth Amendment rendered the Direct-Tax Clauses dead 
letters. If that was his point, where in the world did it come from? 
Seven other Justices said nothing of the sort. Even two of the dissent-
 
 171. Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 114 (1925) (Brandeis, J.). 
 172. 265 U.S. 242 (1924). 
 173. 268 U.S. 628 (1925). 
 174. See generally Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 16, at 1138-40. 
 175. See, e.g., Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) 
(“[T]his Court has . . . approved . . . what it believed to be the commonly understood meaning of 
the term [‘income’] which must have been in the minds of people when they adopted the Six-
teenth Amendment . . . .”); Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174 (1926) (“It was 
not the purpose or effect of that amendment to bring any new subject within the taxing power”); 
Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 481 (1929) (“[T]he settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth Amend-
ment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income without apportionment some-
thing which theretofore could not have been properly regarded as income”); Helvering v. Indep. 
Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 379 (1934) (“The rental value of the building used by the owner 
does not constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment”). 
 176. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 219-20. 
 177. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1734. 
 178. Even then categorization won’t be automatic: there may be “nice questions” as to 
whether a tax is on real estate or not. For example, in Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance 
Co., 292 U.S. at 378, the Court, in dictum, suggested that a tax on what might be characterized 
as imputed income associated with real estate would be subject to apportionment. 
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ers (Justices Brandeis and Clarke) assumed that the term “incomes” 
meant something. Indeed, Justice Holmes felt constrained, albeit 
minimally, by the language of the Amendment. He purported to be 
interpreting the word “incomes” and to be looking for “a sense most 
obvious to the common understanding at the time of [the Amend-
ment’s] adoption.”179 If Holmes was wrong about what people were 
thinking during ratification, however, his conclusion was wrong. The 
language of the Amendment doesn’t suggest anything like Holmes’s 
interpretation, and, probably most telling, Holmes cited nothing—no 
evidence, no authority—to support his contention. 
Justice Holmes provided no evidence or authority because there 
was none. In fact, as I’ve noted, the Senate had explicitly considered, 
and rejected, proposals to delete the references to “direct taxes.”180 
Such a step would really have eliminated “nice questions” about 
meaning, but that didn’t happen. And I can’t imagine the ratifiers of 
the Sixteenth Amendment thought that Congress can define anything 
as income. If there had been any hint that the Amendment would 
permit an unapportioned tax on all forms of unrealized appreciation, 
say—a tax on property—the ratification of the Amendment would 
have been much more difficult, and maybe impossible. 
Ultimately we’re supposed to pay attention to Justice Holmes, I 
guess, because he was Holmes, a “giant,” and that’s pretty much what 
Professor Ackerman says. He notes that “we can never recapture the 
directness of [Holmes’s] lived experience of the [Amendment’s] rati-
fication campaign.”181 As a result, “we are left with Holmes’s ipse 
dixits concerning original understanding—certainly an important re-
source, but one that may be too easily dismissed by readers who have 
not themselves lived through the process of amendment ratifica-
tion.”182 
When the language of the Amendment doesn’t support your po-
sition, and you can’t find any other favorable evidence, posit “wis-
dom” and “lived experience”! I’m sorry, but I find it impossible to 
take these positions seriously. 
After all, the other members of the Macomber Court lived 
through precisely the same ratification process—which ended only 
 
 179. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoting Bishop v. State, 149 Ind. 
223, 230 (1898)). 
 180. See supra notes 152-156 and accompanying text; Jensen, Taxing Power, supra note 
16, at 1120-21. 
 181. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 45. 
 182. Id. at 45-46. Since ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment took over two hun-
dred years, from 1789 until 1992, the universe of people “who have not . . . lived through the 
process of amendment ratification” is pretty small. (I’m still tingling from the experience.) 
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seven years before the case was decided—yet all but Justice Day, who 
joined in Justice Holmes’s opinion, saw things in a very different 
way. What’s the reason for thinking that Holmes’s experience for 
these purposes was more worthy of note than the experiences of the 
other Justices? 
Professor Ackerman likes the Holmesian view because he sees 
the Amendment as part of an uprising to repudiate Pollock and rees-
tablish plenary taxing power: “When the People [sic] mobilize to 
overrule the Court, it seems particularly inappropriate for the Justices 
to respond in a niggling fashion.”183 But viewing the Amendment as 
part of a move to validate an unlimited national taxing power is silly. 
The Amendment was intended to make possible a tax that, at the time, 
reached a trivial fraction of the population. If the “People” were mo-
bilizing, it was to enable a tax that would hit someone else.184 
Notwithstanding Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court thought the 
language of the Sixteenth Amendment was worthy of being inter-
preted, a result that shouldn’t be surprising. (Some might even find 
this result reassuring: language matters!) Not every tax (or part of a 
tax) is automatically a “tax on incomes.” To determine whether a di-
rect tax is exempt from apportionment, we need to determine whether 
it’s a “tax on incomes.” 
 2. Congress 
Modern proponents of a nearly unlimited taxing power also ig-
nore the actions of Congress immediately after ratification of the Six-
teenth Amendment. Congress initially interpreted its expanded power 
to enact an unapportioned tax on incomes in a conservative way. 
Congress’s conduct didn’t necessarily reflect the outer boundaries of 
its power, of course, but we can say this much for sure: after ratifica-
tion, Congress didn’t think that it had unconstrained power to define 
something as “income.” 
For example, Congress didn’t—and, for that matter, still 
doesn’t—define a corporate dividend paid out of pre-1913 earnings as 
being taxable, even though the Supreme Court has suggested there 
would be no constitutional problem as long as the dividend is distrib-
uted after the Amendment became effective.185 Nor did Congress ever 
 
 183. Id. at 55. 
 184. See Jensen, Apportionment, supra note 16, at 2343 n.41 (noting that 1894 income tax 
directly affected only about one percent of the population). 
 185. For 1913, the tax applied only to “net income accruing from March first to December 
thirty-first.” Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, § II.D (38 Stat. 166) 168. Congress didn’t try to 
tax distributions from pre-1913 earnings. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a) (39 Stat. 
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try to tax pre-1913 appreciation in the value of property, even if the 
appreciation is realized after 1913.186 
Congress acted conservatively because the term “taxes on in-
comes”—which came out of Congress, after all—wasn’t understood 
to be all-encompassing. With the Supreme Court looking over its 
shoulder, Congress was being extra careful not to exceed its constitu-
tional powers. We can argue about what the boundaries of congres-
sional taxing power are, but Congress recognized that the Sixteenth 
Amendment hadn’t eliminated boundaries altogether. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article was intended as an exercise in taking constitutional 
provisions seriously, something all readers of Constitutional Com-
mentary should see as a worthwhile goal. The Direct-Tax Clauses ha-
ven’t been hot topics of constitutional discussion for nearly a century, 
but they were intended to be important. And they could still have ef-
fect today if the concept of “direct taxes” retains significance and the 
term “taxes on incomes” is limited in its effects. Although the Six-
teenth Amendment diminished the importance of the Clauses by mak-
ing it possible to have a “tax on incomes” without apportionment, the 
Amendment didn’t repeal the Clauses. 
Not all taxes are automatically constitutional. Words matter, and 
we shouldn’t assume that terms like “direct taxes” and “taxes on in-
comes” are infinitely malleable. No tax since 1861 has been appor-
tioned, and I assume Congress isn’t likely to consider enacting an ap-
portioned tax ever again. But if a proposed tax is going to avoid the 
apportionment requirement, it’s essential that the tax either be indirect 
or be a “tax on incomes.” 
 
756) 757 (defining “dividends” as distributions “out of earnings or profits accrued since March 
first, nineteen hundred and thirteen”); I.R.C. § 316(a)(1) (1994) (defining “dividends” as distri-
butions out of “earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913”). 
 186. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(a)(1) (40 Stat. 1057) 1060 (providing that for 
“property acquired before March 1, 1913, the fair market value of such property as of that date” 
would be its basis); see also I.R.C. § 301(c)(3)(B) (1994) (exempting non-dividend distributions 
exceeding basis to the extent the distribution is “out of increase in value accrued before March 
1, 1913”); I.R.C. § 1015(c) (1994) (treating as the basis of property acquired by gift before 1921 
the value at the time of acquisition). 
